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ABSTRACT  
   
Energy poverty is pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria, located in sub-Saharan 
West Africa, is the world's seventh largest oil exporting country and is a resource-rich nation. 
It however experiences the same levels of energy poverty as most of its neighboring 
countries. Attributing this paradox only to corruption or the "Dutch Disease", where one 
sector booms at the expense of other sectors of the economy, is simplistic and enervates 
attempts at reform. In addition, data on energy consumption is aggregated at the national 
level via estimates, disaggregated data is virtually non-existent. Finally, the wave of 
decentralization of vertically integrated national utilities sweeping the developing world has 
caught on in sub-Saharan Africa. However, little is known of the economic and social 
implications of these transitions within the unique socio-technical system of the region's 
electricity sector, especially as it applies to energy poverty. This dissertation proposes a 
complex systems approach to measuring and mitigating energy poverty in Nigeria due to its 
multi-dimensional nature. This is done via a three-fold approach: the first section of the 
study delves into causation by examining the governance institutions that create and 
perpetuate energy poverty; the next section proposes a context-specific minimum energy 
poverty line based on field data collected on energy consumption; and the paper concludes 
with an indicator-based transition management framework encompassing institutional, 
economic, social, and environmental themes of sustainable transition within the electricity 
sector. This work contributes to intellectual discourse on systems-based mitigation strategies 
for energy poverty that are widely applicable within the sub-Saharan region, as well as adds 
to the knowledge-base of decision-support tools for addressing energy poverty in its 
complexity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
The link between poverty and energy services is a crucial one: it is necessary for the 
delivery and provision of basic needs - food, clean water, shelter, health and educational 
services (WEC, 1999; Toman and Lemelkova, 2003). Often, poverty alleviation programs do 
not recognize this link even though energy consumption is an indicator of both social and 
development progress (Alam et al., 1997; Barett, 2000). Case in point, the United Nations 
millennium declaration which benchmarks a roadmap to reduce poverty and eliminate 
extreme poverty via the millennium development goals (MDGs). The eight MDGs are to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender 
equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and to develop a global 
partnership for development (UNDP, 2003). These goals are tied to the foremost goal of 
eradicating extreme poverty by providing basic needs, however provision of energy services 
is not recognized as one of these basic needs.  
Sub-Saharan Africa which is the poorest region in the world with 47 percent of its 
population living on $1.25 or less per day, is the largest recipient of multiple foreign aid 
programs directed at poverty alleviation (WB, 2011; UNDP, 2015). These programs 
primarily focus on sustainable development, climate and disaster resilience, and gender 
equity in the form of micro loans for small-scale businesses and agricultural ventures.  
Across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), these aid programs come with donor-imposed 
conditions and a reporting system with benchmarks that are not reflective of actual 
incremental improvements in local capacity (human, social, financial, environmental) but 
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rather metrics that correlate to the amount of aid invested and number of projects 
completed (Handley et al., 2008). 
In Nigeria however, almost all of the poverty alleviation programs have been 
initiated by the national government rather than foreign aid. The most notable of these are 
Operation Feed the Nation (1972), Family Support Program (1993), and most recently the 
National Poverty Eradication Program (2001). It is in programs like these that the direct link 
between energy services and poverty alleviation are most visible. 
The most recent of these programs, the National Poverty Eradication Program 
(NAPEP) was created for the “eradication of absolute poverty in Nigeria” (FRN, 2001). Its 
activities were four-fold: (i) youth empowerment through enterprise promotion, (ii) rural 
infrastructure development, (iii) natural resource development and conservation, and (iv) 
social welfare service providing micro loans and other infrastructure establishment and 
maintenance. The funds to run the program were allocated to the 36 Nigerian states and 
their local governments through local NAPEP offices. The rationale is based on the fact that 
home-grown businesses constitute the majority of all registered businesses (80%) and that 
encouraging entrepreneurship would eradicate extreme poverty (Ogechukwu, 2011; FRN, 
2001). Research however shows that most of the micro loans used to start small-scale 
businesses were not repaid because the exorbitant costs of energy services were not 
anticipated, effectively making the businesses non-profitable (Kasali & Sowunmi, 2013). 
Thus poverty alleviation programs that do not explicitly address energy needs are doomed to 
failure because of the direct link between energy and economic productivity.  
It is important to note that energy poverty is disparate from fuel poverty. The former 
is primarily used in the developing-world context to describe lack of access to adequate 
facilities for cooking, lighting, and electrical appliances. It is driven by low levels of 
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Figure 1.1 Electric energy consumption per capita 2010. Source: World Bank. 
electrification, poor or inadequate infrastructure and non-functional institutions, resulting in 
low economic development and other social issues. The latter is used in the developed-world 
context and refers to inadequate heating in the home due to high or rising energy costs in 
relation to low household incomes resulting in impacts to short- and long-term mental and 
physical health impacts (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015). This study focuses on energy 
poverty due to low levels of electrification in sub-Saharan Africa.  
As aforementioned, energy consumption is an indicator of development progress. By 
this metric, Sub-Saharan Africa is the least developed and most energy-poor region in the 
world (fig 1.1).   
This study examines energy poverty in urban locations in SSA countries with Nigeria 
as a case study. Cities in SSA have the highest growth rate in the world, averaging five 
percent annually (Pieterse, 2010). This is due to post-independence macro-economic policies 
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pursued by African governments in the 1960s and 1970s that encouraged the establishment 
of large-scale capital-intensive industries in cities. Agricultural policies and exchange rates 
kept food prices down, creating poverty in the rural areas which depend on agriculture for 
income-generation and thus incentivized migration to the urban areas (Hove et al., 2013).  
Rural-urban migration in SSA countries is the single most important cause of the urban 
population growth rate and accounts for 60 to 70 percent of the urban population (Todaro, 
2000). Historically urbanization is often accompanied by industrialization and rapid and 
sustained economic growth (Hove et al., 2013). However in SSA, rapid urbanization 
occurred during a period of stagnating and declining economic growth and created a 
scenario with increasing urban poverty and stress on the limited economic, social, and 
environmental resources in the cities. With rural-urban migrations expected to increase 
within the region over the next 30 years (Cohen, 2006), the issue of energy poverty in cities 
in SSA is important in the general discourse on poverty and sustainable development. 
Much like the rest of SSA, Nigeria has strong intra-regional ties within SSA because 
present-day SSA nations were carved out of prior empires and kingdoms. It has experienced 
similar challenges with development, governance institutions, and ethnic heterogeneity 
resulting in civil wars. It also the location of the largest megacity in Africa, Lagos, with its 
attendant challenges with compromised infrastructure, supply, and access to energy services, 
and as such is appropriate for studying energy poverty in a sub-Saharan African city.    
This study is in three parts: it first describes the current state of energy poverty and 
then explores causation by expounding on the history of its governance institutions. Next, 
drawing from field-based research, a minimum energy poverty line is proposed and 
electricity needs are modeled for the next twenty years based on population growth 
projections as well as similarities in diet and lifestyle. This portion of the study has been 
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published in a peer-reviewed journal. Finally an indicator-based transition management 
strategy for transition from an energy-poor to an energy-secure economy is proposed. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement. 
Much like most of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria was a colony of Europe, formed after 
the amalgamation of 1914. It is a resource-extractive state with a history of political 
instability characterized by a series of military dictatorships and coups d’état over 25 years of 
its 50 year history as a nation (Okoh, 2003). These political dynamics created a norm in 
which the leadership of the country effectively became a revolving door, with multiple policy 
shifts, new policies created by each new military regime, conflicted regulators due to rent-
seeking behavior, as well as inadequate sanctions due to the proliferation of policies. These 
factors have impeded critical reforms in the energy sector (Amobi, 2006). Current initiatives 
to deregulate the energy sector have opened doors for public-private partnerships in 
addressing energy needs in the form of electrification and cooking fuels, not just within 
Nigeria, but also to supply power to neighboring energy-poor countries (Iwayemi, 2008). 
However research shows that there are institutional hurdles that inhibit the success of any 
such initiatives. Energy poverty is a complex subject encompassing issues related to energy 
supply, access, provision, acceptability, and most importantly, governance. The first part of 
the study will assess the state of energy poverty in Nigeria today, examine legislation related 
to the electricity sector from its inception, and show how energy governance over time has 
created energy poverty in Nigeria today.   
Secondly, while there is extensive research done in the field of extractive 
technologies and operations for and by the international oil companies in the oil and gas 
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sector, the information on energy consumption is limited to aggregate data at the federal 
level (Akinbami et al, 2001; Sonibare and Akeredolu, 2006). This implies that there is no 
disaggregated data on electricity consumption or household demographics related to energy 
access, despite academic discourse on energy poverty in Nigeria being focused primarily on 
generation capacity and consumption levels (Gujba et al., 2010; Oseni, 2011, 2012). Similarly, 
energy poverty literature proposes various estimates for minimal per capita energy needs 
varying from 126kWh to 1000kWh based on research estimates from India and the global 
north (PA, 2008; Yaeger, 2001). However energy needs vary by standard of living and 
regional locations because developing countries consume a fraction of what industrialized 
nations consume per capita (Schoch et al., 2012). There is little information on how much 
energy to provide per capita in this context as there is no appropriate quantification of 
electrification needs (Ikeme and Ebohon, 2005). This study addresses this void by 
computing an energy poverty line for Nigeria that would be applicable to sub-Saharan Africa 
due to similarities in regional diets, appliances available, household energy needs, and 
intensity of use (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001).  
Third, the wave of privatizing vertical integrated public utilities is the current trend in 
developing and rapidly industrializing nations. This study proposes an indicator-based 
transition management strategy with short, medium, and long-term benchmarks that 
encompass the four themes of environmental, social, economic, and institutional 
sustainability.   
1.2 Research Questions 
Three central research questions, and their corresponding sub-questions, are designed to 
address the state of energy poverty as well as to compute an energy poverty line. They are 
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designed to be stand-alone publications in response to the over-arching question of energy 
poverty in urban sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Central research question 1  
What legislations, history, and norms have created energy poverty?  
Sub-questions 
a. What does energy poverty look like in present-day southwestern Nigeria? 
b. How did the landscape of the electricity system evolve? What is the history of 
legislation pertaining to energy?  
c. How did the resource-extractive colonial governance institutions impact energy 
governance?  
d. What legislation and norms perpetuate energy poverty? 
The current state of energy poverty in Nigeria is described using field and visual data 
collected from southwestern Nigeria as well as other sources. The electricity sector is a 
socio-technical system consisting of the physical infrastructure and technology, as well as the 
institutions created, utilized, and perpetuated by the various actors in the sector. Using a 
socio-technical systems approach, a long-term analysis of Nigeria’s electricity landscape is 
conducted to explain landscape changes in the electricity sector encompassing the rules and 
legislation, soft and hard infrastructure, and dominant actors.  
Central research question 2  
What is the current state of energy poverty in Nigeria?  
Sub-questions 
a. What is the average electricity consumption per capita? 
b. What are energy expenses in relation to the average household income? 
c. Are there any dominant consumption trends? 
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d. What is a context-specific minimum energy poverty line (kWh/capita)?  
Aggregate data on electricity consumption in Nigeria estimates 158kWh per capita on 
average (World Bank, 2012). This value is an average of urban and rural electricity 
consumption nationwide. In order to get disaggregated estimates, data from field research in 
urban southwestern Nigeria will be mapped and a context-specific minimum energy poverty 
line will be computed. 
Using conservative estimates of projected population growth, intensity of use 
collected from surveys, an estimation of end-use energy required to supply basic needs (i.e. 
power basic appliances including, but not limited to: a television, radio, fans, light bulbs, 
electric cooker, iron, water pump, as well as supply enough LPG for cooking fuel needs for a 
year) per household, and then per person would be computed. The power ratings will again 
be based on the most commonly available brands of appliances found in the region.  
This energy poverty line would factor in an estimation of technology adaptation and 
affluence such as the correlation found by Batra et al. (2000) between developing nations 
and the desire for consumer goods from non-local sources whose lifestyles they aspired to. 
 
Central research question 3  
How can transition to an energy-secure economy be done sustainably?  
Sub-questions 
a. What is an appropriate sustainable vision for electricity consumption? 
b. What benchmarks are appropriate in this transition? 
c. How will this transition be managed sustainably within the appropriate sustainability 
themes? 
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Transition management involves long-term thinking in framing policy and allows for both 
slow and fast development. This study uses an indicator-based approach to benchmark 
progress in electricity access within a short-, medium-, and long-term timeline. Benchmarks 
are based on the minimum energy poverty line computed from research question two, as 
well as energy poverty literature. 
These research questions are answered in the form of three independent papers each 
with their own abstracts, executive summaries, methods, and results sections: chapter 2 
describes the current state and addresses causation and governance institutions perpetuating 
energy poverty; chapter 3 uses field research to supply disaggregated data on electricity 
consumption and access as well as compute a minimum energy poverty line; and chapter 4 
concludes by proposing an indicator-based sustainable transition management strategy in 
light of the move to privatization in the region. 
1.3 Study limitations and boundaries. 
This study is focused exclusively within south western Nigeria, one of the six 
geopolitical zones of the country. There is minimal data regarding energy consumption and 
access in cities. This extends to data on electricity supply, household consumption, and 
household access. Most initiatives are focused on renewable energy for distributive 
generation in rural towns and villages.  
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Southwestern Nigeria is the most affluent geopolitical zone by population (Ibrahim 
& Ibrahim, 2014). It is also the most politically and religiously stable part of the country 
unlike the other five geopolitical zones which are fraught with Boko Haram terrorism 
activities (NW, NE, and NC zones), kidnappings (SS, SE, and NC zones), and civil unrest 
(NC, and SS zones) (see Fig 1.2) (Dambazau, 2014).  
 
 
Also, in compiling data on electricity access, it was found that unlike western cities 
where there is a geographical boundary between affluent and poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods, in Nigeria it is typical to find extreme affluence next to abject poverty, both 
on the same electrical mains supply, and as such households across a wide range of incomes 
have the same access to power supply (in hours/day). Even though poverty levels in the SW 
Figure 1.2 Nigeria’s geopolitical landscape. Source: Author 
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zone are the lowest in the country, the energy poverty experienced in the region makes it an 
appropriate location for computing a minimal energy poverty line.  
1.4 Intellectual Merit 
This research gives a systems view of energy from a global north perspective, with 
the insights of the cultural nuances of the global south, and drawing from different bodies of 
theory (institutions, socio-technical systems, sustainability science) that are not traditionally 
considered when addressing energy system of developing sub-Saharan countries like Nigeria. 
Few studies have been done that look at energy dynamics at this scale, due to limitations in 
available data, political and religious instability, as well as a dearth of funding.  
This study not only supplies data, it proposes a benchmark that is scalable based on 
population density. Finally it proposes an analysis of cascading effects of institutions of 
energy poverty, advancing an understanding of strategies that transnational, national, and 
local actors can use in addressing energy poverty. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENERGY POVERTY AS A CASCADING RESULT OF A FAILED SYSTEM: A 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CAUSATION 
Abstract 
This study explores causation of the state of present day energy poverty in a sub-Saharan 
African city using cities in southwestern Nigeria as case study. Using a complex systems 
approach drawing from socio-technical systems theory, institutions theory, and rent-seeking 
theory amongst others, a long-term analysis of the country’s electricity governance as well as 
a systems analysis of the electricity socio-technical landscape is conducted. This study finds 
that the kind of colonial governance, ethnic heterogeneity, and public service 
consumptionism and have the strongest impact on present-day energy governance 
institutions. These three factors are indelibly interlinked and create the failure of institutions, 
not just in the electricity sector, but in governance in general.  
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Executive Summary 
This study shows how governance institutional breakdown is created by the kind of 
colonial governance that a country has experienced, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and is 
linked to ethnic fractionalization and beliefs about the relationships between national 
governance and the governed. These interlinked factors create electricity paucity in Nigeria. 
It finds that the greater the number of distinct ethnic identities in a region (ethnic 
heterogeneity), the greater the preference for trusted acquaintanships in relationships. This 
mental model makes leadership (from national, regional, to local levels) emphasize the 
patron-client relationship as the norm, choosing to place kinsmen in vulnerable positions of 
power. 
There is also a unique mentality of civil service consumerism that is specific to 
countries that were ruled indirectly as opposed to those ruled by direct rule (such as 
Botswana) and settler rule (such as South Africa). Because colonies were treated as self-
sufficient entities by their sovereign government, their administrators focused on the most 
efficient policies to extract resources. To recruit and retain employees from colonial nations, 
there was a status quo of concentrating public goods and basic infrastructure such as water, 
electricity, and sewage around residential and administrative areas of local administration. 
This legacy of government intervention created a mental model of public service and public 
goods as the exclusive purview of civil servants in the public sector, and belief that the state 
is solely responsible for public goods such as for schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, and 
other infrastructure. 
In the move towards decentralization and privatization of the electricity sector, 
accountability is expected to increase as the level of ethnic heterogeneity decreases. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In the electricity system of most developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa, there is 
an obvious failure of the technical subsystem: one-third of the world’s population is 
estimated to have no access to electricity; half of this population resides on the African 
continent and live in a state of energy poverty (Pereira et al., 2010). Energy poverty is 
defined by the UNDP as “inability to cook with modern cooking fuels and the lack of a bare 
minimum of electric lighting to read or for other household and productive activities at 
sunset” (Gaye, 2007).  
Sub-Saharan Africa contains two of the top twenty oil-and-gas producing nations 
(Nigeria and Angola) (EIA, 2012). However both of these countries are the bottom twenty 
worldwide for electricity consumption per capita1: Angola (145 of 163 reported countries) at 
248 kWh/capita; and Nigeria (154/163) at 149 kWh/capita (WB, 2012). With household 
electricity consumption an indicator of local economic development (Goldemberg et al., 
1985) and the informal sector constituting fifty percent of the economy in developing 
nations like Nigeria (Meagher & Mohammed-Bello, 1996), the electricity sector in sub-
Saharan Africa is one of the most under-developed, creating pervasive energy poverty in the 
region.  
It is important to note that energy poverty is disparate from fuel poverty. The former 
is primarily used in the developing-world context to describe lack of access to adequate 
facilities for cooking, lighting, and electrical appliances. It is driven by low levels of 
electrification, poor or inadequate infrastructure and non-functional institutions, resulting in 
low economic development and other social issues. The latter is used in the developed-world 
                                                 
1 For all countries for which electricity consumption was reported in 2012. 
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context and refers to inadequate heating in the home due to high or rising energy costs in 
relation to low household incomes resulting in impacts to short- and long-term mental and 
physical health impacts (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015). 
There is a wealth of anecdotal and peer-reviewed literature examining links between 
natural resources, development, and poverty in developing countries in general, and in sub-
Saharan Africa in particular.  
Anecdotal literature such as Michael Peel’s A Swamp Full of Dollars and Nicholas 
Shaxston’s Poisoned Wells depict the realities of civil unrest resulting from failed governance 
institutions tied to the energy sector in oil-rich sub-Saharan African countries. Okonta & 
Douglas’ Where Vultures Feast address social justice, power dynamics, and conflict specific to 
resource extraction in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Similar themes are also portrayed by 
Michael Watts’ Curse of the Black Gold, exposing the social, environmental, and economic 
costs of exploitation of oil, as well as the power dynamics, poverty, and conflict in the Niger 
Delta region. These literature address energy poverty through its most visible symptoms: 
conflict, lack of security, social inequity, pervasive poverty, and environmental degradation. 
They however stop short of exploring causation.   
In academic literature, Macartan Humpreys’ et al.’s Escaping the Resource Curse explores 
the weak institutional structures and mechanisms of accountability, and suggests policy to 
mitigate the resource curse in resource-rich African nations. Michael Ross’ The Oil Curse: How 
Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, argues that the presence of oil has a stronger 
negative effect on development than other minerals. Examining resource-rich countries in 
Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Eurasia, he links weak governance, civil 
conflict, and poor economic performance to the unique properties of oil: scale, source, 
stability, and secrecy. Ross provides a rich analysis of present-day resource curse issues 
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drawing from case studies of those countries. The prevailing themes in these literatures are 
the resource curse, rent seeking, and the Dutch disease: historic context on causation is 
missing.  
Rent-seeking literature claims that phenomena such as energy poverty are a side-
effect of the resource curse, caused by poorly evolved democratic institutions and 
dysfunctional patronage (Damania & Bulte, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006). It posits that 
endogenous and exogenous factors create energy poverty and slow economic growth in 
Africa. Endogenous causality is attributed to factors such as the power imbalance between 
sub-Saharan African states and the extractive industry, the lack of political freedom (Le 
Billion, 2005; Ross, 1999) and democracy (Andersen & Ross, 2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 
2001; Tsui, 2011), bad fiscal policy (Pegg, 2010), power relations (Caselli & Cunningham, 
2007) and geographic and public health issues (Daniele, 2011; de Soysa & Gizelis 2013). 
Within this literature, exogenous causality is linked to post-colonial legacy, 
specifically the political and economic relationships between Africa and the West (Basedau & 
Lay, 2005) and price volatility of natural resources (Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2009). 
However, the combination of exogenous and endogenous factors fail to sufficiently explain 
the success of developing countries such as Chile, Botswana, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Sarraf 
and Jiwanji, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2003; Iimi, 2006; Stevens, 2006). 
In these literatures (resource curse, rent-seeking), scholarship of the political 
economies of energy across the region limits causation to post-independence governance 
institutions. Bostwana, located in the southern region of Africa, is a resource extractive state 
that was a colony of the British Crown, yet it does not experience the same levels of 
governance institution weakness or energy poverty. The literature fails to provide contextual 
linkages between the history of resource extraction and governance that explains this outlier. 
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Thus it ignores the conditions under which the institutions were formed, thus analyzing the 
symptoms instead of the causes (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008). For those countries that are 
outliers, what factors determined the decisions by its leadership specific to transparency, 
power dynamics, fiscal policies, and governance? 
On the other hand, energy poverty scholarship in the last decade has focused on 
rural access. Other themes include distributed generation for rural electricity access via 
renewables (Williams et al. 2015; Akinbulire et al, 2014; Kamalapur, 2008), quantification of 
energy access (Pereira et al., 2011; Pachauri et al., 2004; Chidebell-Emordi, 2015), energy 
policy (Sullivan & Barnes, 2007; Sagar, 2005; Tharakan, 2007), and social equity (Oparaocha 
& Dutta, 2011; O’Dell et al., 2014). 
Energy poverty literature on sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by descriptive data on 
the current state (indices of development and corruption, rural access for electrification and 
cooking fuels), quantifying energy access, small scale rural projects to provide sustainable 
technology (solar microfridges, efficient cookstoves, etc) and electricity from renewables. 
These themes all fall within the scope of energy poverty in rural sub-Saharan Africa. 
However rapid urbanization is occurring with increasing stress on the limited economic, 
social, and environmental resources in the cities. With rural-urban migrations expected to 
increase within the region over the next 30 years (Cohen, 2006), the issue of energy poverty 
in cities in sub-Saharan Africa is important in the general discourse on poverty and 
sustainable development.  
This study posits that within the sub-Saharan African region, typeology of colonial 
governance, cultural/ethnic heterogeneity, and public service consumptionism (mental 
models about the relationship between the national government and public goods) 
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determine the strength of post-colonial governance institutions, and consequently, energy 
policy. 
2.1.1 Why is it important to understand causation from a historical perspective? 
 
 Studies of energy poverty show strong links between poverty and energy 
access, creating a vicious cycle because households without energy services are trapped in 
deprivation (Masud et al., 2007; Mishra, 2015). However, the wave of electricity sector 
reform pushing decentralization and privatization in developing countries is based on 
economist theories that privatization will bring benefits to a sector plagued by inadequate 
supply and access, amongst other institutional limitations. This implicitly assumes that 
increasing electricity production means access for all and therefore mitigates energy poverty.  
This has not been found to always be the case when global best practices models of 
privatization are employed. Such was the case of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania where 
privatization did not eliminate issues with regulation, accountability, and transparency in the 
national electricity system (Hall, 2007; Keating, 2006). This trend seems to hold true for 
Nigeria which is at the early stages of privatization of its electricity sector. In 2013 Nigeria 
unbundled its electricity sector into three infrastructure entities: distribution companies, 
generation companies, and a transmission company. Within the first year of privatization 
generated capacity declined from an already low 4517 MW to 3670 MW with little noticeable 
changes in the institutional functioning – tarrifs, regulatory bodies, supply and access, as well 
as infrastructure failures (Joseph, 2014). It is important to know if privatization efforts are 
following an appropriate sustainable transition pathway within the context of the electrical 
sector socio-technical system. 
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Secondly, historical perspectives are important in explaining path dependency in a 
technological system within its financial, social, and institutional components (Van der 
Vleuten & Raven, 2006). Electricity systems that are vertically integrated utilities are 
characterized by the involvement of multiple actors, complex and multi-layer institutions, 
laws, regulations, and policies and need to be studied from a socio-technical systems 
approach (Sovacool, 2014). Within Nigeria’s electricity system, path dependency that creates 
energy poverty is explored using a long-term analysis of the socio-technical regime, adapting 
a similar approach by Verbong and Geels (2007). This is done in a two-fold analysis: the first 
is a systems analysis of the electricity landscape to determine the dynamics of the electricity 
sector. This extends to the rules, infrastructure, and dominant actors within the landscape 
from the inception of the electricity sector to date; the second analysis delves into causation 
and explains the electricity landscape through its governance institutional history. 
Finally, electricity sector transitions occurring in sub-Saharan Africa have been 
studied with a focus on deployment of renewables in rural locales (Ahlborg &  Sjöstedt 2015; 
Ulsrud et al., 2015). There is a paucity of scholarships with a socio-technical systems analysis 
of the electricity sector of its national grid especially in cities. This paper contributes to 
scholarship in this niche. 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first attempt to determine causation of 
institutional failure in the national electricity system of a developing energy-poor sub-
Saharan African nation using a long-term analysis of its socio-technical regime and focusing 
on large-scale electrical utilities.  
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2.2 Analytical framework 
The theoretical framework in this study utilizes a long-term analysis of the electricity 
sector using the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP).  Large technical systems such as the 
electricity sector are deeply woven into the overall structure of society and as such, evolve 
with changes in society and the economy (Hughes 1983; Hughes et al., 1997). The MLP has 
been used to illustrate and analyze the impact of society on innovations and transitions 
within the electricity sector: Kamp and Vanheule (2015) show that socio-cultural factors as 
well as mental models inhibit the growth of the small wind turbine (SWT) niche sector in 
Kenya; similar work done by Yuan et al. (2012) use the MLP to show that pressure from 
socio-economic transitions due to accelerated industrialization are primary inhibitors to a 
low-carbon transition pathway in China’s electricity regime; Sutherland et al. (2015) use the 
MLP to illustrate how niche innovation in the renewable energy sector is driven by the 
agricultural sector with farmers in Germany, the Czech Republic, and the UK being the first 
to experiment with biogas (from manure) and wind energy. 
The MLP gives insight into the external environment in which the electricity sector 
has developed over time and will be used to analyze Nigeria’s electricity sector within the 
case colonial and post-colonial Nigerian society. This paper models the MLP analysis after 
Verbong and Geels’ (2007) long-term analysis of the Dutch electricity system to determine 
factors that supported and opposed transition to renewable energy options in the Dutch 
electricity generation portfolio mix. It was found that changes in the dynamics of the 
electricity sector occurred slowly over time: the Dutch electricity sector became 
decentralized and production and distribution of electricity became separated; the sector 
became ruled by market mechanisms instead of internal top-down mechanisms which 
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changed the mind frame from an engineering-based one to that of profits, shareholder value 
and managerial mind-frame; rules and social networks of the sector changed, creating new 
actors with new roles.  
Similar to the transitions in the Dutch electricity system, the Nigerian electricity 
system is a monopoly ruled by internal top-down mechanisms. Both systems were initially 
top-down and transitioned (or in the case of Nigeria, is transitioning) to a market-driven 
system, evolving slowly over time as they became decentralized.  
Focusing on the regime level of the MLP, this study makes a long-term analysis of 
Nigeria’s electricity domain. Section 3 covers data collection methods, section 4 describes 
energy poverty in Nigeria today; section 5 analyzes dynamics in the social networks, rules 
and technologies; section 6 analyzes recent changes in the system (privatization, MYTO) and 
projected trajectories; section 7 combines both analyses to explain the current state of the 
energy system and the resultant energy poverty; Section 8 concludes the discussion on 
complex adaptive systems and energy poverty. 
2.2.1 The Multi-Level Perspective  
The MLP consists of three levels (Geels, 2002): niches, regimes, and the landscape of 
the STS (see Fig. 2.1). Niches serve as incubation rooms for new technologies at the micro-
level where innovations (technological or market) occur, building social networks and 
learning processes (Verbong & Geels, 2007). In the Nigerian electricity system, there is 
virtually no innovation occurring due to the absence of an R&D allocation in the national 
energy budget.  
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Figure 2.1. Multiple levels of MLP featuring dimensions of the electricity sector 
sociotechnical regime. Adapted from Geels (2002, 2004). Source: Author. 
 
There is opportunity for adapting leap-frog technologies that have been successfully 
tested in other energy markets as is on-going in the telecommunications industry. One such 
example is the recent introduction of pre-paid metering. 
The overall electricity landscape forms the macro-level of the MLP which evolves 
slowly and impacts niche and regime dynamics (Verbong & Geels, 2007). The electricity 
landscape in Nigeria, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, is dogged with multiple policy shifts 
at the federal level, and non-existent supply at the household level. However, the majority of 
the energy system dynamics takes place at the meso-level of the socio-technical regime. 
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The study focuses on the socio-technical regime which is the meso-level of the MLP. 
Regimes are created by patterns in energy systems–rules embedded in engineering practices, 
skills and procedures, ways of defining problems, ways of handling persons and the 
attendant artefacts - that become embedded in institutions and infrastructure (Rip & Kemp, 
1998, p. 340). These sociotechnical regimes reinforce existing technological patterns in many 
ways: creating cognitive routines that are resistant to novelty (Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
regulations and standards (Unruh, 2000), adapting lifestyles to technical systems, as well as 
sunk investments in physical technology and infrastructure (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Christensen, 1997). In some energy systems these regimes create and perpetuate energy 
poverty. This is because these actors impact, and are in turn impacted by, each other. They 
adapt and respond to each other and artefacts but unlike actors in a typical econometric 
model, actors in a complex adaptive system like Nigeria’s electricity system lack rationality 
and foresight in their interactions (Foster, 2005). These interactions are done via physical 
and social networks, and influenced by norms and institutions. Since actors have their vested 
interests that, within the stabilized regimes, make them resistant to change, it is important to 
determine the dynamics between the social and technical subsystems that create energy 
poverty.  
The socio-technical regime consists of three interlinked dimensions – the electricity 
system itself, the actors, and the rules and institutions within which the actors operate (Fig. 
2.1). The electricity system refers to the hard infrastructure (i.e. the generation plants, the 
electrical grid, substations, and local distribution) as well as the soft infrastructure (tariffs, 
financing, and trained technical personnel). The actors range from households, industry and 
businesses, to energy producers and suppliers, economic and environmental regulators, as 
well as policy makers and government. The rules and institutions refer to codified laws, 
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regulations, and policies regarding the electricity sector, as well as cultural attitudes and 
norms about the sector that impact the modes in which the actors interact with the energy 
system. 
Within STS literature, STS analysis is typically used for analyzing more mature 
electricity systems in the context of climate change, energy security, and other drivers of 
technological change (Magnusson, 2012; Foxon, 2013; Galvin & Sunnika-Blank, 2014; 
Einsieden et al., 2013; Bolton & Foxon, 2015). In electricity systems of developing nations, 
the predominant trend in STS literature is analyses focused on adaptation of renewable 
energy for distributed generation at the rural level (Ulsrud et al., 2011; Sovacool et al., 2011; 
Sesan, 2012; Müggenburg et al., 2012). There is a gap in STS literature aimed at the 
functioning and effectiveness of large-scale electricity systems in developing nations. This is 
important to get a holistic view of how the systems function, especially as energy poverty is a 
direct result of failed electricity systems in developing nations: in this paper, electricity is 
used as a proxy for cooking fuel, and is required for lighting and powering cottage industry 
(C-Emordi, 2015).  
Drawing from literature on path dependency and mental models, as well as data 
from historical legislation, expert interviews, archival databases, this paper devolves the 
energy system by showing how these aforementioned factors enable and perpetuate energy 
poverty within the regime level of the MLP. This would be done through a historical analysis 
of the electricity landscape in Nigeria to determine the mental models, changes in ministerial 
oversight, and path dependency in Nigeria’s electricity socio-technical system. 
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2.3 Methods 
The data used in the long-term analysis of the electricity system is based on 
information collected in the field, historical archival analysis of documents including 
electricity data from the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC), natural 
resource governance information from the Nigerian Constitution, and information on 
colonial-era governance institutions from “The dual mandate in British tropical Africa,” 
written in 1921 by Lord Lugard, the British crown’s administrator over its protectorates in 
West Africa. It is a comprehensive compilation of governance policies used by the British 
Crown in Africa.  In addition, peer-reviewed articles were obtained by means of search 
engines of scientific publishers including Elsevier/ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, and Scopus. 
Other studies not reported in journals, such as governmental analyses and international 
journals, were searched by means of the Google Scholar search engine.  
All information from literature and national documents was analyzed via data 
reduction methods with the data sorted, categorized, and prioritized based on relevant 
emerging themes (Blum & Langley, 1997). 
2.3.1 Data collection 
This study used a convergent parallel design of the mixed-methods approach, 
collecting both quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously. The quantitative data was 
used to measure distinguishing characteristics, elemental properties, and empirical 
boundaries of the specified variables (Nau, 1995). Qualitative data was used to gather an 
understanding of lived experiences as a group or at the individual level (Silverman, 2006). 
Qualitative data was obtained via participatory research which helped to understand the 
subtle nuances of the state of energy poverty within its context and reduce the distrust of the 
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people being studied (Macaulay et al., 1999, pg. 774). It also helped to understand social 
actor’s perspectives, as well as validate data obtained from other sources (Londof, 1995). 
Initial informal interviews were carried out via random sampling in December 2012 
at the University of Ibadan, Oyo state. For these surveys, participants were randomly 
selected from the university employees, contractors, vendors, students, and visitors via 
convenience sampling. The purpose of these preliminary interviews was to understand local 
perspectives of energy issues, gauge understanding of technical terminology, and ascertain 
appropriate framing of questions (for instance when collecting data on household 
demographics we found that in certain settings it is inappropriate to directly ask “how many 
children do you have?” because it implicitly assumes that the respondent has children2; 
instead we asked “we know that God blesses us with children, how many children do you 
have so far?”). These unstructured interviews also enabled us to build trust with prospective 
interviewees for future structured surveys.  
The second phase of data collection was conducted in June 2013 in urban locations 
in three southwestern states: Lagos, Osun, and Oyo states. Both quantitative and qualitative 
data were compiled from multiple sources namely: field research in the form of household 
surveys, expert interviews, and group interviews. 
Household interviews were conducted by convenience sampling to collect data on 
actor dynamics pertinent to electricity access. A total of 105 households (n = 105) were 
interviewed: 46 households in Oyo state, 49 households in Osun state, and 10 households in 
                                                 
2 There are a couple reasons for this – first, there is strong stigma associated with being a married woman 
and not having children. Secondly, there is a preference for male children and this must determine the order 
of gender when inquiring about children : girls first, then boys. Third, even though infant mortality rates 
have consistently dropped over the past decade, it still occurs and in Nigeria (as well as other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa) it is taboo to speak of children who have died. 
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Lagos state. Households were selected randomly from neighborhoods located near large 
markets due to time and logistical constraints.  
The survey was modeled after the Mimmi (2014) study designed to collect data on 
household energy use. The question types include dichotomous as well as nominal-
polytomous close-ended questions with equal priority given to both qualitative and 
quantitative responses (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). These cross-sectional surveys were 
conducted via face-to-face interviews in public places (store fronts, mixed-use dwellings). 
Interview questions were broadly categorized into household demographics, energy access in 
the form of electricity supply, consumption, and affordability, as well as environmental and 
human health services.  
Recruitment for group interviews and expert interviews was accomplished via chain 
sampling. The researcher initiated prospective stakeholders to participate and make 
recommendations for additional candidate that fit the research criteria (Biernacki & Waldorf, 
1981).  
Expert interviews and group interviews were conducted on the campus of the 
Federal University of Ibadan in Oyo state, Nigeria. All candidates consented to interviews 
after receiving in-person description of the study and their prospective roles. Due to subtle 
cultural nuances that influence power dynamics, three separate sets of group were 
conducted: with undergraduates, graduate students, and lay-people. The researcher took care 
to minimize gender bias as much as possible, as well as “false” consensus from dominating 
participants (Litosseliti 2003 pp 22).  
Group interview questions were open-ended and pertained to the participants’ 
beliefs and mental models about energy governance and public goods consumption. Most 
questions were open-ended or semi-structured about specific aspects of the electricity 
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system. Group interview sessions ran for approximately one hour. Saturation occurred when 
no new themes emerged. 
These were complemented by qualitative interviews with experts in Nigeria’s energy 
sector. For the purpose of this study, experts refer to Nigerian nationals who are 
professionals in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. This study limits the scope to those who have 
represented the country at national and international level deliberations such as the NNPC, 
the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Department for International Development 
(DFID). For expert interviews, questions were more in-depth, eliciting information on the 
actor networks and the physical electricity grid. Interviews lasted for roughly 40 minutes 
each.  
Saturation size was achieved at 15 participants for group interviews and 5 
participants for expert interviews due to the nature and scope of the topic (Morse 2000 pp 
4). 
Before integrating qualitative and quantitative data, each dataset was analyzed and 
interpreted separately according to the process described by Rosenberg et al. (2013). Next, 
general themes were identified and coded based on relationship to quantitative data 
collected. Finally the information extracted was used to inform gaps in literature review and 
quantitative data collected. 
2.4 What does energy poverty in Nigeria look like? 
Low-density energy fuels are the primary source of fuel for cooking and lighting. Of 
the urban households surveyed, 88% used some mix of cooking fuels including firewood, 
kerosene, gas and electricity with almost a quarter of the households (23%) using a mix of 
firewood and kerosene, the least dense fuels (Figs 2.2, 2.3). 
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Fig 2.2a Energy poverty in Nigeria.  
Source: The Borgen Project. 
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Fig 2.3 Cooking fuel mix of urban southwestern Nigerian households. Source: Author. 
 
Fig 2.2b Nigeria Power employee works 
on a tangle of lines in Lagos. 
Source: Sunday Alamba/Associated Press 
Blackouts and brownouts (locally referred to as low current) are the norm in urban 
southwestern Nigeria with The average number of hours of daily power supply was 9.5 
hours in Lagos state, 10.7 hours in Osun state, and 7.2 hours in Oyo state with most 
households receiving between 1 and 8 hours of electricity supply across the three states (Fig 
2.4).  
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Kerosene lamps and candles are used for lighting after sunset for households that 
cannot afford a generator.  Private self-generation with portable generators accounts for 
electricity supply for 72% residents in urban southwestern Nigeria (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015) 
creating in Nigeria, the world’s largest concentration of small-scale generators (Economist, 
2010). These clusters of generators in both residential and commercial buildings contribute 
to air pollution in the form of SOx, NOx, and particulate matter as well as noise pollution 
(see Fig 2.5) and have been documented as contributing to the rising asthma prevalence in 
Nigeria (Awofeso, 2011; Sonibare et al., 2014). 
The state of electricity supply adversely affects the manufacturing sector: companies 
that are large enough, such as the Delta Steel Mill, the Aba Textile Company, and Dangote 
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Fig 2.4 Average Electricity Supply by State. Source: Author 
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Cement, own their own thermal power plants and source natural gas to operate it directly 
from the Nigerian Gas Company via independent operators (NNPC, 2010). 
Other estimates have put private generation for businesses at 90% of electricity 
needs. Trans-national corporations like Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble rely on self-
generation for 100% of their power supply (Connors, 2009). For smaller scale and cottage 
industries, the costs of continuous operation are too high, reducing the productivity of 
income-generating activities.  
Fig 2.5 Cluster of portable generators outside a local business area. Source: Dada Joseph 
 
There is also the social inequity associated with energy poverty - for energy-poor 
households that depend on firewood and charcoal, it is the responsibility of the females and 
female children to collect the biofuels, often walking distances that take away time from 
income-generating activities and education (Reddy & Nathan, 2013). This loss of human, 
economic, and social capital is in addition to indoor air pollution associated with traditional 
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fuels. Thus energy poverty is truly multi-dimensional from its social impacts in the form of 
health, equity, access, and education of women to economic impacts reducing productivity 
and income generating activities, energy poverty retards overall development.  
2.5 Dynamics of the Electricity Sector 
Drawing from data on generation, transmission, and distribution as well as 
governance institutional structure from Nigeria’s electricity regulatory body, NERC; 
published studies on current system challenges, as well as historical and archival analysis of 
Nigeria’s electricity sector, this paper explores the dynamics in the electricity sector from the 
colonial era when it was first introduced, to the present day. It also briefly discusses the 
dominant actors relevant to the electricity landscape, as well as the electricity market. 
The rules governing Nigeria’s electricity sector have evolved over time with the 
change in governance from colonial governance to post-independence. These changes can 
be broadly categorized as the pre-independence regime, and the post-independence, pre-
Fig 2.6 Young girls collecting firewood from drainage gutters in Ibadan. Source: Author 
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privatization regime. The changes in infrastructure, controlling bodies, and regulatory 
oversight occurred at the regime level and are subsequently discussed.  
2.5.1 Pre-independence (1896-1960) 
Electricity was first produced in the colony and protectorate of Lagos, Nigeria in 
1896 with a total generation capacity of 60kW (Okoro & Chikuni, 2007). Niche dynamics in 
the global electricity sector were occurring in the industrialized world with the introduction 
of electricity to homes and businesses at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Lagos, 
the administrative center of the protectorate, street lighting was introduced as early as 1898 
but was limited to the European residential area (Olukoju 2003, pp. 21). According to 
Olukoju (2003), due to the prohibitive costs at the time, electrical power supply was 
extended only to a few strategic administrative buildings, the hospital and the government 
house. Power supply was rationed and switched off at 11 p.m. because the annual cost of the 
staff and fuel required to operate and maintain the thermal power plant was almost £2,000. 
Subsequently, the political climate began to shift with the Northern and Southern 
protectorates merging with the protectorate of Lagos to become the colony and protectorate 
of Nigeria in 1914. The country then became an amalgamation of these three separate 
regions – the North, East, and West with local administrations that were overseen by the 
colonial government through indirect rule, the impacts of which will be discussed later. By 
1929, the electricity system consisted of the Nigerian Electricity Supply Company (NESCO) 
which began generating and distributing power in Jos, as well as the Native Authorities in 
other parts of the country (Barros et al., 2014).  At this time street lighting was extended to 
other areas of Lagos state and funded by a tax rate of nine pence per unit annually.  
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In 1946, the British colonial authority created the public works department (PWD) 
under whose jurisdiction the creation and supply of electricity in Lagos fell. However, 
although electricity was supplied to an increasing proportion of Lagosians, regulations were 
introduced to ration supply. This was for two reasons: demand was fast outpacing supply; 
and materials for maintenance had to be shipped from Great Britain (Olukoju, 2003). The 
details of these restrictions included: permanent disconnection of residences of consumers 
for non-payment; non-issuance of permits for appliances not restricted to off-peak usage; 
non-issuance of permits for temporary illumination; and limiting applications for new 
residential electrical installations to minimal illumination. 
By 1950, a central electricity supervisory body, the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria 
(ECN), was formed to control all existing thermal power plants. The organizing principle 
went from municipal and regional control, to a vertical public operated utility. The power 
sector was under centralized administration with the authority to mandate tariffs and regulate 
utilities under the purview of the ECN (see Fig. 2.7). The regime level of the electricity 
system thus consisted of the native authorities, NESCO, and the PWD as the principal 
actors subject to the jurisdictional authority of the regional colonial government.  
Figure 2.7. Actors and networks in electricity regime pre-independence. Source: Author 
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The physical infrastructure of the energy system was a disjointed one, limited to 
locales that were the seat of local administration. This included the cities of Lagos in the 
southwest, the seat of the central government, Kaduna, the seat of the Northern Provinces, 
and Ibadan, the seat of the Southern Provinces. The cities of Calabar, Port Harcourt and 
Kano also housed members of the Legislative Council. (SYB, 1940). The generation, 
distribution, and transmission infrastructure were small-scale and manageable, maintained by 
skilled workmen supplied by the Crown (Olukoju, 2003).  
The electricity landscape was controlled at the macro-level by the colonial regional 
government. This included creation of the country’s first energy legislation, policies, and 
regulations (Oke, 2013). This soft infrastructure of the electricity landscape was encapsulated 
in the overarching energy infrastructure. 
2.5.2 Post-independence, pre-privatization (1960-2005) 
Post-independence, the Nigerian electricity system underwent major upheavals. The 
landscape changed from one in which the governance of the system was a mix of native 
authorities and national power generation companies, to one nationalized bureaucratic entity.  
The changes in the landscape started with the creation of the Niger Dams Authority (NDA) 
in 1962 to develop hydro power stations. Ten years later both the ECN and NDA were 
merged to form the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) through the NEPA Act of 
1972. The intent of the act was twofold: to homogenize the tariff rates and assume 
responsibility for the financial obligations of the electricity sector; and to more effectively 
utilize human, financial, and physical capital to ensure widespread supply of electricity 
throughout the country (Okoro & Chikuni, 2007).  
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NEPA had the monopoly of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. It 
was also a self-regulating agency, without outside checks and balances. Between 
independence and 2010, 27 power plants were commissioned (Ibitoye & Adenikinju, 2007). 
As the population grew, the country’s generation capacity did not have a corresponding 
growth. The infrastructure also began to age and fail, and with the deep regional and ethnic 
divisions that persisted, new administrations sought to impact the deficiency in supply with 
quantifiable milestones. These manifested in the form of constructions of new power 
generation plants. Over time, this became a pattern such that succeeding administrations, 
often from very different ethnic groups than their predecessors, resorted to new power 
generation infrastructure construction to mark their time in office. The exception to this rule 
was with the military dictatorships which were purely rent-extractive. 
There are currently 21 operating power plants connected to the national grid: 3 hydro, 2 
steam, 14 gas, and 2 combined gas/steam (Oyedepo et al., 2014). In all the total installed 
capacity is 10.897 GW. However they all operate at less than 50% of capacity. This is 
attributed to infrastructure failures, poor management practices, and economic sabotage 
(Oseni, 2012). In addition to the problems associated with electricity generation, there is 
Figure 2.8 Nigeria’s electricity regime (1960-2013). Source: Author 
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about 30-47% of loss in electricity transmitted due to outdated infrastructure and resistive 
losses (Akpabio & Akpan, 2010). There is no information on the distribution network to 
ascertain actual consumption patterns, as well as a scarcity of trained technical personnel to 
maintain and run the infrastructure. Between 1980 and 2011 there has been an increasing 
investment in hard infrastructure without the corresponding investment in soft 
infrastructure (skilled workforce, maintenance regimes, research and development). 
On the consumer side, tariffs are the lowest in Africa due to federal subsidization 
and as such, the revenue generated is insufficient to operate the electricity supply system 
(Ibitoye & Adenikinju, 2007). For consumers who experience persistent blackouts, monthly 
electricity bills are generated for the same amount whether or not electricity has actually been 
supplied that month (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015). If payments are not made, the electricity bill 
continues accruing. Customers pay some portion of the bill to remain connected to the 
electricity grid.  
In addition there are a significant number of unmetered consumers, specifically 
households and cottage businesses that simply tap into the electricity grid from any nearby 
transmission line, leading to load shedding and brown-outs. There are legitimate attempts to 
own meters: it is typical for individuals to prepay for a meter and be put on waitlists that last 
for years (Vanguard, 2013). However, the distrust those electricity consumers have for the 
federal electricity body has perpetuated an indifference to attempts at change in the 
electricity sector. This apathy creates path dependency, perpetuating the rules and mental 
models of inefficiencies of government-run institutions.  
From its inception to its dissolution in 2005, NEPA was unable to meet the 
increasing electrical power demands of a growing Nigerian population. At this point the 
economies of scale that make a vertical operated public utility a viable monopoly (Kahn, 
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1989) ceased to exist and the view was towards privatization as a means to address 
inefficiencies in the electricity sector.  
The Nigerian Electric Power Policy (NEPP) was created in 2002 to overhaul 
electricity sector legislation. It was tasked to: draft a new electricity law, establish an 
independent regulatory agency, develop a wholesale electricity market, provide subsidies for 
less privileged Nigerians in the form of a consumer assistance fund, and establish a Rural 
Electrification Agency (REA) to create and manage a consumer assistance fund targeted at 
rural electrification projects for rural customers (NERC, 2008).   
2.5.3 The Electricity market 
The energy market in Nigeria has always been some kind of monopoly (see Table 
2.1). When the sector first started producing electricity, the market was open to electricity 
generation by native authorities, however the size of the national power generation company 
(NESCO) created a natural monopoly for tariff structures. Subsequently the power industry 
became a government monopoly under the supervision of the Electricity Corporation of 
Nigeria (ECN, 1950) which then became the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA, 
1972), and eventually the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN).  
It is important to note that as demand for electricity outpaced the available supply, 
self-generated electricity came to play a dominant role in the country’s electricity sector. The 
generator industry is itself a monopoly (popularly known as the generator mafia) and an 
active part of the electricity sector (Garside, 2011). 
The suppliers of the electricity sector include the replacement parts market for both 
hydro and thermal power plants, and natural gas supply for thermal power plants. The 
generating and transmission infrastructure are old models that are outdated and incapable of 
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carrying the current load demands. In addition, the parts are not available when needed due 
to the non-existence of a maintenance budget (Oyedepo, 2014). 
The fuel needed to power the thermal plants is typically supplied via Gas Supply 
Agreements (GSAs). GSAs are negotiated between the generating companies (GENCOs) 
and the independent Exploration and Production (E&P) operators of the mining leases that 
are obtained from the Nigerian Gas Company. Currently, thermal power plants are 
commissioned without sufficient fuel to make them operational (Akinosho, 2013).  
Industry is the largest competition for gas supply to the power sector. These 
industries include steel companies, cement production factories, textile mills, and chemical 
companies (NNPC, 2010). This competition is due to the fact that the negotiated agreements 
are for low fixed prices which are often not paid (Makan, 2013). Marginal field operators in 
the oil and gas sector thus have a preference for industry with which they have a more 
reliable financial arrangement. 
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Table 2.1 Governance institutions of the Nigerian Electricity System 
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The low electricity tariffs impact the government-specified GSA rate, which in turn 
discourages independent operators from developing fields known to only contain gas as 
opposed to both oil and gas. 
The primary consumers of Nigeria’s electricity are the cottage industry, households, 
and industry. The dismal power sector makes large scale manufacturing prohibitively 
expensive such that the manufacturing sector only contributes 4% of national GDP 
(Economist, 2010). Manufacturing companies that are large enough, such as the Delta Steel 
Mill, the Aba Textile Company, and Dangote Cement, own their own thermal power plants 
and source natural gas to operate it directly from the Nigerian Gas Company via 
independent operators. For smaller scale and cottage industries, the costs of continuous 
operation are too high, reducing the productivity of income-generating activities.  
Self-generation has made it possible for the cottage industry, which comprises 80% 
of all registered businesses, to thrive in the midst of blackouts and brownouts (Ogechukwu, 
2011). It is increasingly affordable to purchase a portable 1kW power generator for about 
$100 US, albeit constituting a loss to the economy of $130 billion US annually from both 
households and businesses (ASI, 2015). The dependence of the country’s economy and 
government on self-generation has made generator importers a powerful voice in Nigeria’s 
power sector. With the potential loss of business in urban areas, there is no incentive for this 
lobby to support electricity reforms, requiring strong regulatory enforcement for legislation 
that improves infrastructure maintenance and performance going forward. 
2.6 Recent changes in the energy landscape 
In the recent path to privatization, there was a mass restructuring of the electricity 
sector. New legislation and regulatory policies were put in place, and new technologies were 
  42 
Figure 2.9 Nigeria’s electricity regime (2005 – 2013). Source: Author 
proposed for this evolving landscape. These changes, as well as projected trajectories of the 
system, are subsequently discussed in light of the historical energy governance institutional 
challenges.  
2.6.1 The path to privatization (2005-2013) 
In 2005 the Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSR) repealed the NEPA Act and 
the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN) was formed to serve as a transitory 
holding company in preparation for the restructuring, unbundling, and privatization of the 
electricity sector. In preparation for this transition, the EPSR Act further provided for the 
creation of “Successor Companies” comprising of six generation companies (GENCOs), 
one national transmission company (TRANSCO), and eleven distribution companies 
(DISCOs) (see Fig 2.9). 
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In September 2013, Nigeria made the move from a vertically integrated public utility 
to a mostly privately owned unbundled electricity system by the dissolution of PHCN. 
However, the Nigerian government still maintains its position as the dominant actor in the 
electrical sector and supervises the operator of the sole transmissions company 
(TRANSCO). 
The deregulation of Nigeria’s electricity sector is the first significant change in the 
country’s electricity landscape since independence. It changes who the dominant actors are, 
the rules of the interactions between actors, and the goals of the sector. 
Under the new regime, the federal ministry of energy has direct oversight over the 
Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) as well as the Bureau of Public 
Enterprises (BPE) and the national transmission company (TRANSCO). 
NERC is responsible for issuance of licenses for the electricity market participants 
(generation and distribution companies), developing industry standards for the transmission, 
generation, and distribution companies, as well as setting of tariffs (NERC, 2015). The BPE 
is tasked with the actual transaction activities required for the privatization and 
commercialization of public enterprises (BPE, 2013). 
The TRANSCO makes the electricity generated by the GENCOs available for 
distribution to the DISCOs, which in turn make it available to the households. Transmission 
is currently done by PHCN and distributed through the 11 distribution companies: Abuja 
Electricity Distribution Plc, Benin Electricity Distribution Plc, Eko Electricity Distribution 
Plc, Enugu Electricity Distribution Plc, Ibadan Electricity Distribution Plc, Ikeja Electricity 
Distribution Plc, Jos Electricity Distribution Plc, Kaduna Electricity Distribution Plc, Kano 
Electricity Distribution Plc, Port Harcourt Electricity Distribution Plc, Yola Electricity 
Distribution Plc.  
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To date, the national government has been the primary regulatory body over the 
electricity industry. The jurisdiction of the different national parastatals over the electricity 
sector has been fuzzy at best. However, the Energy Corporation of Nigeria has had direct 
jurisdiction over PHCN as the electricity sector prepared for the transition to privatization.  
2.6.2 The Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) 
Electricity in Nigeria has been a public welfare service and its pricing was historically 
subsidized and set by the previous national electrical power body, PHCN, subject to annual 
budgetary allocations. The methodologies used to ascertain the prices were unknown; 
however, the prices did not reflect income generated form the electricity sector (NERC, 
2007) and are some of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Electricity pricing across select sub-Saharan African countries (c/kWh) 
 Chad Niger Cameroun Benin Ghana Nigeria 
Social Tariff 
(100kWh/month) 11.07 16.85 17.33 21.60 9.41 1.58 
Residential Tariff 
(600kWh/month) 25.60 16.85 19.10 24.51 12.92 9.68 
Commercial Tariff 
(1800kWh/month) 26.75 20.52 23.55 24.00 21.92 9.66 
 
Pricing of electricity prior to the first MYTO in 2008 was N6/kWh ($0.048/kWh 
USD3), which did not reflect the actual cost of electricity at N11.26/kWh ($0.09/kWh USD). 
More so because of low generation capacity, with the basic 1000W generator, the average 
consumer pays almost twice the actual cost of generated electricity in self-generation at 
N22/kWh ($0.13/kWh USD) (NERC, 2007). 
In 2008, the first tariffs were set by the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(NERC) via a multi-year tariff order (MYTO) that was adjusted annually to reflect changes 
                                                 
3 Adjusted for 2008 exchange rates.  
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in inflation, exchange rate, and gas prices (NERC, 2007). It set tariffs for the next five years 
while providing a 15-year projection for the evolution of tariffs with time. The tariffs were 
gradually increased from N6/kWh ($0.048/kWh USD) in 2008, to N10/kWh ($0.067/kWh 
USD) in 2011 with decreasing subsidy to make up for the actual cost of electricity. In its first 
iteration, the MYTO did not factor in other sources of generation fuel other than natural 
gas, as well as the difference in conditions that the new GENCOs might face (Bello, 2013). 
This deficiency was corrected in the next MYTO which was designed for 2012 to 2017. This 
new structure also created consumer classes based on maximum monthly electricity 
consumption levels. 
The new MYTO also stipulates the tariff pricing in the post-privatization electricity 
landscape pending the increase of the number of generation companies in the market to 
truly make the market an open one. 
2.7 Explaining the regimes through the institutional landscape 
In the preceding sections, this paper discusses Nigeria’s electricity landscape and the 
changes at the regime level. There have been minimal changes between the pre-colonial and 
post-independence rules and institutions in the sector.  
The rules created to manage electricity consumption during the early nineteenth 
century have been carried forward such that they have shaped perceptions about the 
electricity artefacts (the physical infrastructure). Consequently the actions of the actors 
(government, market, civil society) are constrained by the technical possibilities, even though 
they themselves create these constraints. 
 It is simplistic to explain away this adverse relationship that brings about energy 
poverty as corruption. That term is itself a complex phenomenon created and perpetuated 
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by the right confluence of circumstances: it might show that there are codified rules with 
absent sanction, but it does not explain why or how some rules are fixed while others are 
malleable.  
This paper limits the discussion to those factors that impacted the energy landscape, 
namely: colonial governance type; ethnic heterogeneity resulting from social and cultural 
dislocation; and the new institutionalized dependence on public service. 
2.7.1. Colonial governance history  
There is consensus that colonialism has an impact on the long-term developmental 
trajectories of former nation states (Brown, 2000; Grier, 1999; Mahoney, 2003; Sokoloff & 
Engerman, 2000; Young, 1994).  The most significant impact of colonial rule was the 
changes it brought to the social, economic, and political landscapes of the colonies. 
However, the success of development of the countries post-independence was dependent on 
the type of colonial rule enforced.  
Scholarship on the colonial period indicates that colonies were ruled on the principle 
of colonial self-sufficiency (Young 1994, pp. 84). Thus each colonial power employed 
administrative strategies that were most efficient for resource extraction or in the case of 
southern African nation states, settlement. Resource extractive states are those colonial states 
created for the singular purpose of extracting resources rapidly; investments made in those 
states are limited to transportation of the resource and security (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
 There were four types of colonial rule: company rule that focused on the exploitation 
of natural resources for investor profit with social and cultural dislocation created by the 
forced movement of people; direct rule focused on assimilation, removed local leadership 
from power using “divide and rule” tactics, and created social and cultural dislocation due to 
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economic and labor policies (primarily practiced by the French, Belgian and Portuguese 
colonialists); indirect rule erroneously assumed all Africans belonged to tribes and delegated 
local “big men” as ruling figure heads in societies that never had such political structures. It 
created social and cultural dislocation due to economic and labor practices (primarily 
practiced by the British); and finally, settler rule with strong government systems protecting 
rights of settlers and infrastructural support for settler owned businesses,  indigenous 
peoples were denied rights of political participation (primarily practiced in South Africa) 
(Khapova, p. 117). 
Nigeria, as well as other British colonies, was ruled via indirect rule. Under this 
governance system, indigenous auxiliaries were needed to organize labor for the colonial 
economy, with a preference for younger men who had some knowledge of the official 
language (English or French). According to Geschiere (1993), the first generation of chiefs 
were young men who had worked in the colonial armies as soldiers, cooks, or porters. This 
was problematic in most of the African colonies because the indigenous governance norm 
was to appoint the elders as rulers. This was worse, still, for areas that were not accustomed 
to any form of centralized authority, with families living in autonomous family clans or 
villages.  
It is important to note that the three regions that were amalgamated (the Northern 
protectorate, and the Southern protectorate consisting of the eastern and western 
geopolitical zones) have very different governance structures. The Northern protectorate 
was a structured state with clear jurisdictions in its hierarchy. It consisted of communities 
that were formerly part of Islamic empires, kingdoms, and caliphates for over five hundred 
years (“Katsina”, 2015). Similarly, the western states in the Southern protectorates had 
belonged to empires and kingdoms for centuries (“Oyo”, 2015). The monarchies were ruled 
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by a hereditary line of Obas, a political system that still is in place today. Conversely, the 
eastern states of the Southern protectorates consisted of monarchies as well as traditionally 
stateless societies living in autonomous local communities (“Igbo”, 2015). Stateless societies, 
such as the Igbos, do not have chiefs with the same broad political powers as those in the 
west or north. 
The appointment of these “warrant chiefs”, whose authority depended on their 
British warrants and local police, created a ruling class without legitimacy, a colonial legacy 
without traditional roots. These forms of governance were however essential for the success 
of local and regional colonial administration. According to Lord Lugard4 (1922), native 
chiefs constitute an integral part of the colonial administration with well-defined duties that 
must overlap as little as possible with that of the British officers. The local chief “must 
understand that he has no right to place and power unless he renders his proper services to 
the state” (p. 203).  
Secondly, these chiefs were given broad institutional powers with control over 
communal lands and local law enforcement, thus replacing indigenous systems and their 
checks and balances (Boone, 1994; Mamdani, 1996). These institutional powers enabled 
them to play administrators and local subjects against each other, maintaining considerable 
autonomy from each, and controlling information and resource flows between the colonial 
administration and the local population (Clapham, 1982; Reno, 1995). 
These chiefs received a salary, but most of their livelihood was earned from the 
exaction of rents on their chiefdoms using the military power provided by their regional 
colonial authority. This created a system of decentralized autocracy and the mental model of 
leadership thus became one of rent-seeking due to the lack of legitimacy of the local chiefs. 
                                                 
4 Lord Lugard was the British colonial governor-general of Nigeria from 1899 to 1906 (Khapoya, 1998). 
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By the 1960s much of sub-Saharan Africa was experiencing independence from the 
different colonial entities. At this time the indigenous leadership (both legitimate and 
illegitimate), business men with the attendant patronage networks, and most prominently, 
former military officers, emerged as the new political elite (Fukuyama, 2014; Obi, 2011). 
These new nation states and their political elites were familiar with only one political 
tradition - the colonial era autocratic government with a governor in charge of its 
bureaucracy and all industry directed at resource extraction (Sandbrook, 1986; Fukuyama, 
2014).  
This model of governance was quickly duplicated post-independence between 1960 
and 1999: of the 180 changes in leadership in Africa, 101 of them took place through a 
military takeover or some other non-constitutional event (Goldsmith, 2001). Nigeria itself 
had six military coups spanning 30 years of dictatorships until democratic elections in 1999 
(LeVan, 2014). Since the advent of democratic elections, little has changed in the country’s 
political traditions – it is still primarily a resource extractive state and described to have 
experienced a democratic transition without a democratic transformation (Obi, 2011).  
According to Obi (2011), strong client-patron links still exist at all levels of public service. 
Also, attempts to spur contribution to national GDP from other sectors of society - 
manufacturing, agriculture, etc - are negligible; neither is there a long-term plan to create 
economic self-sufficiency of the individual states that make up the country. Continuing in 
the legacy of colonial governance, it is a country where 9 oil-producing states provide the 
financial resources to run all 36 states at the local and state levels, as well as the national 
government, rather than one in which each state exploits its individual resources for 
economic self-sufficiency.  
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Nation states like Nigeria that were created via fractioning of multiple tribal states 
with widely differing indigenous governance traditions to form one weakly integrated nation, 
governed via colonial indirect rule with ensuing post-colonial issues of legitimacy of 
leadership have been found to be more likely to be politically unstable, and have poor 
bureaucratic effectiveness and rule of law, controlling for other factors (Lange, 2004). 
These factors were exacerbated by the ethnic heterogeneity of the newly created 
nation states.  
2.7.2 Ethnic heterogeneity 
While there was pre-existing ethnic and linguistic diversity, there was no regional 
concentration of caste or racial groups (as in India or the United States), giving an illusion of 
ethnic homogeneity. Thus in the efforts to create economies of scale and minimize 
bureaucratic costs, large states were drawn arbitrarily across indigenous tribal and linguistic 
groups, splitting them up across two or sometimes three colonial borders (Green, 2013). The 
consequence was the creation of new ethnic identities that today make up 43 percent of the 
average African state’s population, making it the most fractionalized continent (Englebert et 
al. 2002, pp. 1096). Nigeria is the most fractionalized nation on the continent with over 250 
ethnic identities (Omotosho, 2014).  
Grabowski (2006) indicates that at independence, the new nation states were mainly 
dependent on the agricultural sector as the primary driver of the economy. It was also the 
largest industry in terms of employment. However, with the adoption of urban bias, i.e. the 
concentrating of public and social services at lower prices for urban residents than for rural 
residents, and agricultural policies that kept the prices of food down, the agricultural sector 
weakened and the ruling elite became increasingly dependent on the extractive industries. 
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To keep their hold on political power, the ruling elite strengthened their positions by 
relying on client-patron relationships, a phenomenon exacerbated by the degree of 
fractionalization in the more ethnically heterogeneous nation states. 
There is a strong negative strong correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and the 
quality of institutions and economic growth (Alesina et al., 2003). Ethnic heterogeneity is 
strongly correlated with economic stagnation because it makes societies more likely to select 
socially suboptimal policies (Easterly, 1997).  
Easterly (1997) found that ethnic heterogeneity (i) encouraged the adoption of 
policies that fostered rent-seeking and retarded economic and developmental growth and (ii) 
made it more difficult for groups to form consensus on promoting public goods.  
Fractionalization leads to weak governance institutions as people seek a better life by 
capitalizing on private relationships (Bates, 2000). Kinsmen in the different levels of public 
service are expected to perform acts of patronage benefitting their kinship group (providing 
employment in the civil service, legally or illegally; granting preferential access to public 
sector resources outside of governmental regulation e.g. license to import specific goods, 
contracts to build infrastructure etc.). Padro i Miquel, (2007) found that fear of exclusion 
from patronage drives members of an ethnic group to support a ruler who is their kinsman 
even with evidence that the individual is interested in rent-extraction. In a highly 
heterogeneous society, this creates a system of uncoordinated bribe-takers in which each 
independent rent-taker fails to internalize the impact of their rent-seeking, leading to a total 
collapse of the system with more rents per unit of output and less output (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993).  
In heterogeneous societies, relationships are organized along ethnic alliances, thus 
ethnic bias is self-sustaining. It is shaped by codes of conduct that reduce inter-ethnic 
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interactions, described by Fafchamps (2004) as statistical discrimination and the network effect that 
retard economic and development growth.  
Statistical discrimination describes discrimination based on belonging to a different 
ethnic group due to the high cost of gathering and evaluating information (i.e. discrimination 
based on stereotypes of the person’s ethnic group: e.g. Batswana are lazy in civil service, 
Urhobos are cunning, Igbos are materialistic, etc.). Jellal and Zenou (2005) indicate that this 
kind of discrimination in the labor market exists in ethnically heterogeneous developing 
countries with employees from similar ethnic backgrounds as their employers having stability 
of income as opposed to the volatility of income experienced by employees from different 
ethnic backgrounds. This bias inhibits a vigorous economic environment, limiting 
recruitment of talent to the network of trusted kin and acquaintances rather than 
appropriately skilled employees in the electricity sector at all levels. 
The network effect refers to the characteristic of market transactions in Africa involving 
multiple intermediaries linked by a chain of personal acquaintances. This leads to fragmented 
small homogenous markets, sustained through low labor mobility and creating high 
transaction costs in inter-regional domestic trade. The low labor mobility creates insufficient 
aggregation and thus lower division of labor, knowledge spillover, and higher costs of shared 
inputs (Hamaguchi, 2012). In essence knowledge-sharing is inhibited because of preference 
for relationships with others with whom there are shared social conventions and definitions 
even if there is minimal interest in the area of knowledge. Similar to statistical discrimination, 
the network effect ensures that the ruling elite establish hereditary claim on administrative 
offices via patron-client linkages rather than effective and qualified employees. 
Both of these factors are endogenous variables that contribute to the dismal state of 
Nigeria’s electricity sector infrastructure. Much like foreign aid NGOs that equate success 
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with the number of projects completed rather than the longevity and viability of the 
individual projects, successive national government regimes emphasize construction of new 
facilities rather than funding the operations and maintenance of existing generation, 
distribution, and transmission networks. As aforementioned, funds for purchasing fuel or 
maintaining the physical electricity infrastructure are missing or non-existent thus 
undermining supply of, and access to electricity (Akinosho, 2013). The rationale for this can 
be attributed to perverse incentives in benchmarking: each administration desires a physical 
edifice that memorializes their time, and by extension, the impact of their kinship group, 
while in office. 
As to the issue of maintenance culture in Nigeria, there is scant literature on the 
subject. It is however the theme of interest across a wide range of disciplines: from 
agriculture to publishing, telecommunications, fisheries and aquatic sciences, healthcare 
facilities management, and aviation, there is a marked absence of maintenance funding in 
annual budget allocation (Adegbulugbe et al., 2015; Eyitayo, 2011; Akinsanmi et al., 2013; 
Alhassan et al., 2012; Adenuga et al., 2007; Amara, 2009). In instances in which there is a 
budget, there is resistance to implementation of preventive maintenance activities either due 
to insufficient human capital or a breakdown in operational oversight. Maintenance culture 
in Nigeria is a rich subject that warrants further research but will not be explored in this 
paper. 
2.7.3 Public service consumptionism  
Colonialism created a legacy of dependence on the national government for public 
services through a confluence of factors.  
First, in order to recruit and retain employees from colonial nations, there was a 
status quo of concentrating public goods and basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, and 
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sewage around residential and administrative areas of local administration. This legacy of 
government intervention was viewed as an attribute of modernization and was inherited by 
the emerging political elite, in addition to western housing and physical infrastructure, 
creating a skewed allocation of public goods, an urban bias,  that is still pervasive today 
(Ichoku et al., 2012). 
This engendered the mental model of public service and public goods as the 
exclusive purview of civil servants in the public sector, and a dependence on the state for 
schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, and other infrastructure: 100% of participants surveyed 
indicated that it was the responsibility of the national government, not the state, or local 
government, or cooperatives, or community groups, to provide these public benefits. Thus 
expectations of public service as a source of affluence and influence are pervasive. 
Secondly, spurred on by the acceleration of statehood continent-wide, the rapid 
urbanization due to the presence of large natural resource deposits, and the dilution of 
traditional governance restraints due to the amalgamation of these disparate nation states 
and tribes, the new political elites sought legitimacy in neopatrimonialism (Andreski, 1968). 
Neopatrimonialism, the use of state resources to secure loyalty of clients, centralizes power 
around the leadership (local or national) (Taylor, 2008), and much like ethnic 
fractionalization, weakens the effectiveness of government institutions, reducing the quality 
of governance, and thus the choice of economic policies.  
Englebert (2000) found that the more legitimate the national government was – 
legitimacy defined as similarity between the existing political leadership, pre-colonial political 
systems, and norms of political authority - the greater the quality of its governance 
institutions. This legitimacy is tied to factors such as similarity of scale of governance pre- 
and post-colonialism (Olson, 1987) as well as lineage (e.g. descendants of pre-colonial ruling 
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families) (Englebert, 2000). Thus the more fractionalized a country is, as most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa post amalgamation, the less likely the view of legitimacy of the president. 
The president is often referred to in the third person rather than the possessive first person: 
he is “the president”, not “our president” if he does not come from the same tribal group. It 
must also be noted that in countries with high degrees of heterogeneity like Nigeria, there is 
some acceptance of neopatrimonialism: it is expected that kinsmen in positions of influence 
(i.e. upper level public service) perform acts of patronage benefitting their kinship group, 
and making this a new kind of norm. This kind of patronism further exacerbates the 
perception and belief that state resources are inexhaustible, belong to no one and are 
controlled by “the government”, an amorphous all-powerful wealthy entity. There is a 
resulting tragedy of the commons with regards to public goods such as roads and natural 
resources (forestry, water bodies, etc.) that is pervasive and accepted. 
These mental models, these deeply ingrained assumptions and generalizations that 
influence our understanding of the world and how we act, helped to create the current state 
of energy poverty which is most visible through its symptoms: conflict, lack of security, 
social inequity, pervasive poverty, and environmental degradation. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The new waves of privatization and free market preference in public goods supply 
and administration sweeping the developing world do not explicitly have poverty alleviation, 
and in the case of electricity systems, energy-poverty alleviation as their goal. There is an 
assumption that an increase in generation and distribution capacity implies an energy-secure 
population or universal access. This does not guard against perverse outcomes from the 
well-intentioned policies and, in the Nigerian electricity system, raises a few issues. 
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First, this study shows that the historic colonial governance legacy has created mental 
models about governance as a facilitator for resource extractive activities. The governance 
institutions outside of oil and gas production and exportation are weak: the last national 
energy policy was drafted in 2003 with emphasis on energy production and resource 
exportation. Language on strategies for regulation, transparency, and enforcement in the 
energy sector were non-existent, making changes in the deeply ingrained energy governance 
institutions less likely; the only difference now in the energy landscape is the actors.  
Also, studies show that because utilities like the electricity sector function most 
efficiently as monopolies, incumbent power generating and distributing companies have the 
potential to derail reforms by using their position to foreclose markets, deter entry, and 
abuse competitors and suppliers (Boscheck, 1994). In the current set up of Nigeria’s 
electricity sector, NERC is responsible for issuing of licenses and specifying industry 
standards. However, as the sector matures and incumbent power companies dominate the 
different geographic regions, checks and balances would need to be instituted to keep the 
marketplace truly open. 
Secondly, within the context of a socio-technical system, with the actors’ (in this case 
the political elite) behaviors molded by long-term path-dependency, what measures are in 
place to address deeply ingrained norms? Neopatrimonialism is linked to legitimacy of 
governance as well as fractionalization. Without checks and balances to disincentivise the 
preference for suboptimal policies and dependence on kinship networks, the incidences of 
patronage will continue to sabotage progress even with codified rules that eschew graft. This 
is a complex issue tied to the lack of a cohesive and inclusive national narrative. 
Third, landscape change is a slow continuous process. The socio-technical landscape 
encompasses heterogeneous factors such as fuel prices, economic growth, conflict, political 
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coalitions, cultural and normative values, as well as environmental problems (Geels, 2002). 
Changes within the electricity system are determined by the context of these broader external 
factors which impact the institutions within the regime. Thus change should be expected to 
occur more slowly at the landscape level, spurred by incremental changes within the regime. 
Finally, rural electrification is best addressed by distributed generation. However, the 
technologies that are used must have local buy-in. It is unrealistic to expect that generation 
plants whose parts can only be sourced abroad, and for whom there is no local human 
capital (trained technicians), will be sustainable. The success of rural electrification would 
depend on technologies that indigenous technicians are relatively comfortable with (hydro, 
biogas, etc.) and for which parts can be sourced locally (for instance reverse-engineering 
automobile alternators to serve as micro-windmill turbines). This must be true at the level of 
development of the local economy so as to stimulate industry towards more technologically 
mature systems. 
This paper provides the first step of understanding the historical context of the 
electricity landscape in Nigeria. At present, Nigeria’s political landscape is a dynamic system 
with an unclear future which makes it a rich subject for future work on feasible governance 
institutional changes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A CONTEXT-SPECIFIC MINIMUM ENERGY POVERTY LINE5 
 
 
Abstract 
Only half of the population of Nigeria has access to the electricity grid, and for those who 
have access, the supply of electricity is sporadic. Government estimates of electricity 
generation fail to give an accurate picture of electricity supply because they do not account 
for actual generation capacity as well as the siting of power plants predominantly in urban 
areas. This paper models average per capita electricity needs in three southwestern Nigerian 
states. The analysis is based on data on electrical power supply, appliances available in 
households, as well as intensity of use. Using a mixed-methods approach, we found that in 
urban southwestern Nigeria, per capita annual electrical energy consumption ranged between 
230kWh to 2089kWh with an average of 463kWh as opposed to the 101.5kWh reported. 
There was very weak correlation between income, household size, and total household 
electricity consumption because most households lack steady income, and also because of 
the salary-hold phenomenon. Our model indicates that 1667 kWh annually is sufficient to 
provide for basic needs in an urban household. Electrification demand was also modeled for 
projected population growth to 2050. 
  
                                                 
5 This portion of the dissertation has been published as “The African electricity deficit: Computing the 
minimum energy poverty line using field research in urban Nigeria” in Energy Research & Social Sciences 
journal; see Comprehensive Bibliography. 
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Executive Summary 
This study proposes minimum electricity consumption per person annually based on 
field research in urban southwestern Nigeria. Urban southwestern Nigeria is the most 
affluent geopolitical zone of the country but it experiences a higher intensity of energy 
poverty because of the population density (i.e. the number of people per unit area is higher). 
Energy poverty is a term used to describe lack of access to adequate facilities for cooking, 
lighting, and electrical appliances. It is driven by low levels of electrification, poor or 
inadequate infrastructure and non-functional institutions, resulting in low economic 
development and other social issues. 
Energy poverty intensity is expected to increase in sub-Saharan Africa with rural-
urban migration is expected to increase over the next thirty years. This implies increasing 
stress on already stressed economic, environmental, and infrastructure resources in urban 
areas. 
The proposed minimum electricity consumption of 1667 kWh per person annually is 
sufficient to provide for basic needs in an urban household. Electrification demand was also 
modeled for projected population growth depending on the household types. 
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3.1 Introduction  
High levels of energy poverty in Africa are the driving force for African 
governments, donors and NGOs to increase electricity access in Africa, whether by fossil 
fuels or renewable energy, the subject of this Special Issue.  Discussions about increasing 
wind energy (Mukasa, et al., 2015) and capacity-building through PhD engineering programs 
(Colenbrander, et al., 2015), among other issues identified in this Special Issue, must 
consider what we mean by energy poverty, a term that is usually defined in two main 
contexts:  Western-Urban and Developing-Rural. 
Western-Urban refers to industrialized states. In this context, energy poverty is 
defined in terms of social exclusion and material deprivation (Buzar, 2007; Healy, 2003; Sen, 
1980; 1984; 1999). Energy poverty creates class distinctions and prevents ownership of 
luxury goods. This definition is often subjective and can vary widely within a small 
geographic area. 
  Developing–Rural is specific to rural areas in developing states. This definition of 
energy poverty is computed based on estimated energy required to provide electricity for 
lighting and energy-dense fuels for cooking in a rural locale (Sovacool et al., 2012; Parajuli, 
2011; Goldemberg, 1998; Pachauri and Spreng, 2003; Foster et al., 2000).  Almost by 
definition, world regions that are predominantly classified as energy poor are comprised 
mostly of developing states: this includes the 2.5 billion people who rely on biomass as 
cooking fuel, and the 1.6 billion people without access to electrification (Modi et al., 2005). 
 The population density of the energy poor is higher in urban than in rural areas, with 
the rural-to-urban migration trend expected to increase over the next 30 years. The energy 
poverty problem cannot be solved without first determining what per capita energy 
consumption is for urban areas in developing states (Cohen, 2006; UN-DESA, 2012).  
  70 
The quantitative benchmarks that exist in the energy poverty literature are computed 
for the lack of access based on physiological needs and purchasing power for a fixed amount 
of basic needs in goods and services. For the Developing-Rural context, two minimal energy 
poverty lines have been computed: 1000W per capita (Goldemberg et al., 1985) and 300W 
per capita (Pachauri and Spreng, 2004) which convert to an annual consumption of 8765.8 
kWh/cap and 2629.7 kWh/cap respectively. But in urban areas, people need more energy 
than just electricity for lighting and energy-dense cooking fuels; they also need energy to run 
cottage industries, which contribute 50% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa (Meagher & 
Mohammed-Bello, 1996). Note that these electricity levels (Watts/cap) indicate the amount 
of electricity that needs to be supplied continuously per person and directly infer what the 
name-plate capacity for electricity generation should be for a given population. (Name-plate 
capacity is the maximum output of a generator or other electric power equipment under 
conditions set by the manufacturer). This is different from the total electricity consumed or 
produced per year, i.e. kWh/yr. For the purposes of simplicity, all subsequent electricity 
consumption units will be kWh. 
The definition of basic needs varies by standard of living and regional locations; 
developing countries consume a fraction of what industrialized states consume per capita 
(Krugmann and Goldemberg, 1983).  The definition depends on (1) the definition of well-
being, (2) cultural understanding of harm or suffering, and (3) relative possibilities at the 
time. 
The definition of well-being is subjective and tied to concepts like functionings (the 
various things a person may value doing and being) and capabilities (what a person is able to 
do). Functionings and capabilities may be cultural norms or codified laws. An example of 
something that is both a functioning and a capability is the ability of women to participate in 
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community leadership (Sen 1984, 1994, 1997).  A woman may be capable of leading but 
prevented from doing so by norms or laws.  In such a case, the woman is effectively, but not 
actually, incapable of community leadership. 
Secondly, cultural and individual understanding of harm or suffering varies from one 
place to another. For instance, in Nigeria it is quite common to see unaccompanied groups 
of three- to five-year olds walking for up to twenty minutes to and from their elementary 
schools on weekdays. This is a norm and has gone on for generations. Similarly, primary- 
and secondary-school students trek for up to an hour or more daily to and from school. 
Describing this time spent trekking in the hot sun as a hardship would only elicit blank stares 
among average Nigerians; it is the norm and not perceived as hardship, but rather as time for 
socializing. 
Finally, the relative possibilities available at the time determine what would be 
considered a basic need within the given context. These possibilities depend on factors that 
influence energy consumption habits, such as geographical environment, income, 
production, culture, and hierarchy of energy choices. 
The Goldemberg (1985) estimation of the annual minimal energy poverty line at 
8765.8 kWh/cap is based on energy consumption between 1978 and 1982, with assumed 
non-commercial energy use of 3506 kWh/cap annually. It estimates in a year, 12,272 kWh, 
14,901 kWh, and 15,778 kWh per-capita of electricity is required to satisfy basic human 
needs in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, respectively. These calculations are based on 
historical Energy-to-GNP correlations. Assumptions of residential energy-use levels are 
based on levels in Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, all of 
which have very different climates, nutritional requirements, cultures, and energy choices. In 
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addition to being based on aggregate data and very different energy consumption habits, this 
estimate is outdated. 
The annual average of 4382.9 kWh/cap proposed by Pachauri and Spreng (2002) 
also aggregates energy consumption across urban and rural households, while incorporating 
direct and indirect energy consumed. Subsequent computations (Pachauri, 2004) calculate 
household energy consumption based on embedded energy content in household goods and 
services produced. This method limits determination of the amount of energy a region 
requires to provide for electrification and cooking fuel; these two requirements define the 
energy poverty line in developing states. 
Existing energy poverty benchmarks are either outdated or based on non-contextual 
definitions of basic needs. I argue that a contextual energy poverty benchmark is needed for 
sub-Saharan Africa, which is home to half of the world’s energy-poor populace (Pereira et 
al., 2011).  Furthermore, a per capita energy benchmark should include electricity as a proxy 
for cooking fuel because of the danger of household fires in the sub-Saharan African region, 
as well as to simplify determination of energy profiles at different spatial scales. 
Researchers have estimated the direct and indirect disaggregated household energy 
requirements for developing states such as India (Pachauri and Spreng, 2004; Chaurey et al., 
2004) and South Africa (Davis, 1998). However, these estimations are few and difficult to 
find and, as mentioned above, they focus on rural locales. This article is the first published 
attempt to estimate and analyze disaggregated urban household electricity consumption and 
to model future electricity needs for an urban locale in a sub-Saharan African country. 
I computed the minimal energy poverty line based on disaggregated household 
energy data collected in urban regions in Nigeria, using reported activity levels and 
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household energy consumption. Using Nigeria as a case study, the model determines the 
per-capita minimal household end-use energy needs for urban sub-Saharan West Africa. 
Nigeria is significant in sub-Saharan Africa because it contains most of the region’s urban 
settlements, thanks to its long-established and varied pre-colonial urban traditions (Potts, 
2012). The levels of energy poverty in southwestern Nigeria are representative of other 
urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa, and as such, for urban energy poverty in the region as a 
whole. Also, the conversation on electricity supply in Nigeria, and most of sub-Saharan West 
Africa, is moving from favoring a centralized government-run institution to favoring 
decentralized providers in the form of independent power providers (IPPs) (The White 
House [Press Release], August 5, 2014; Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2002). While literature holds 
that the energy poor spend a significant proportion of their income on energy (Buzar, 2007; 
Sovacool, 2012), electricity prices are subsidized in Nigeria, and consumers need pay only a 
portion of their bill to continue receiving service. Energy poverty thus arises from 
inadequate supply rather than from limited consumer capacity to pay for electricity. To 
estimate how privatization of power generation will affect energy poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa, we must first know how much power is supplied, what proportion of income the 
average household spends on energy, and how much power is consumed by households.  
This study provides that information for urban areas in southwest Nigeria. 
3.2 Data and Methods 
3.2.1 Study area  
 
Southwestern (SW) Nigeria is one of the six geopolitical zones of the country. (See 
Fig 3.1 for a map of the geopolitical zones.)  It consists of Oyo, Osun, Ogun, Ondo, Ekiti, 
and Lagos states. Though poverty levels in southwestern Nigeria are the lowest in the 
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country (because Lagos is one of the wealthiest states in the country), the region is an 
appropriate zone of study because it experiences pervasive energy poverty (Sowunmi et al., 
2012). 
In addition, this region is the most politically and religiously stable part of the 
country, unlike the other five geopolitical zones, which are fraught with Boko Haram 
terrorism activities (NW, NE, and NC zones), kidnappings (SS, SE, and NC zones), and civil 
unrest (NC and SS zones). 
Southwestern Nigeria lies in latitude 6°21’8” North and longitude 2°31’6” East 
(NPC, 1991). It has a tropical climate with wet and dry seasons, belonging to the Af (tropical 
rainforest climate) and Aw (tropical wet and dry or savannah climate) Köppen-Geiger 
climatic zones. Temperatures range from 21°C to 34°C (69.8°F to 93.2°F), and annual 
rainfall ranges between 150cm to 300cm (Faleyimu et al., 2010).  
Figure 3.1 Nigeria’s geopolitical landscape. Source: Author 
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The three states of Lagos, Oyo, and Osun are the most densely populated in the 
southwestern region, and also account for the largest rural-urban migration for that 
geopolitical zone. The study was conducted in urban areas in the three states.  The survey 
sites were selected based on the definition of an urban area according to Gol’s (2001) 
criteria:  population greater than 5,000, population density of at least 400 persons/km2, and 
the percentage of male workers engaged in non-agricultural sectors must be at least 75.   
The data on energy consumption were collected in the Local Government Areas6 
that include the studied cities: Oshodi-Isolo in Lagos state (population  density (pop. den.)  
13,811 inhabitants per square kilometer (inh/km2)), Ibadan-North in Oyo state (pop. den. 
434 inh/km2), and Ife-Central in Osun state (pop. den. 1506 inh/km2). 
Unlike some cities in developing and developed states in which affluent and poverty-
stricken neighborhoods are geographically separated, in Nigeria it is typical to find extreme 
affluence next to abject poverty, both on the same electrical mains supply and therefore 
having the same power supply from the power company. For the purpose of simplicity, I 
have taken conservative estimates of power consumption for the refrigerator which cycles of 
and on, and I assume that households that have the same appliances would run them for the 
same length of time. Based on this assumption, while the total electricity consumption for a 
household is dependent on the appliances used, the intensity of use for each appliance is the 
same. This meant that sampling could be randomized in neighborhoods irrespective of the 
range of incomes represented by the diversity of household types.  This randomization 
increased the validity of the data collected. 
                                                 
6 A Local Government Area (LGA) is the third tier of the administrative structure in Nigeria, subject to the 
control of the state government (Asaju, 2010). 
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3.2.2 Data Collection 
The literature on energy access initiatives in Nigeria provides no data on urban 
residents’ access to, or consumption of, energy. Disaggregated data on energy consumption 
in general, and electricity consumption in particular, are non-existent in Nigeria, as is 
information on usage of energy and appliances, and data on transaction costs, hire-purchase 
arrangements (rental, leasing, collective purchase of energy infrastructure), and energy 
preferences. But all of this data is necessary to get an accurate picture of energy poverty 
(Prasad, 2002). 
Prior to this study, data on energy use in urban cities had not been collected.  This is 
in part because electrification initiatives have been focused on renewable energy for 
distributive generation in rural towns and villages (Bugaje, 2006; Akinbami, 1994; Ngala et 
al., 2007; Akinbami et al., 2001). To collect data on household end-use energy consumption, 
I used a convergent parallel design of the mixed-methods approach.. Both quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected simultaneously. The quantitative data was used to measure 
distinguishing characteristics, elemental properties, and empirical boundaries of the specified 
variables (Nau, 1995). Before integrating qualitative and quantitative data, each dataset was 
analyzed and interpreted separately according to the process described by Rosenberg et al. 
(2013).  
Using convenience sampling, I surveyed 46 households in Oyo state, 49 households 
in Osun state, and 10 households in Lagos state for a total of 105 households (n=105), to 
collect data on household ownership of telecommunication devices, information and 
entertainment electronics, and electrical appliances.  Households were selected randomly 
from sample neighborhoods located near large market areas. The survey was modeled after 
the Mimmi (2014) study designed to collect data on household energy use. That survey 
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included questions on electricity expenses, household size, as well as the types of appliances 
used during discrete time periods, which enabled computation of energy intensity.  
The survey was refined and tested for fit with the intended regression model. In 
order to administer it effectively, it was translated into Yoruba, the native language (Lloyd et 
al., 2002).  Modifications needed to be carried out on the dataset before a regression model 
could be fitted. In principle, the regression analysis should be applied to all respondent 
households. In practice, however, certain observations had to be excluded because of the 
incompleteness of the data and missing values. Thus, households that did not report any 
expenditure on electricity were excluded. It is possible but quite unlikely that these 
households really had no electricity requirements. Other households were excluded because 
they were located in neighborhoods that represented outliers, for example, the neighborhood 
located next to military housing that had 75-100% electrification because high-ranking 
military officials resided there. While the example of this neighborhood is pertinent to 
understanding power dynamics in the provision of energy services, an examination of power 
dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.2.3 Data Analysis 
The data collected were used to determine per capita end-use energy consumption; 
relationships between income, household energy expenditure, household demographics, and 
total household energy consumption; and to project consumption patterns in the future.  
3.2.3.1 Computing electricity consumption 
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The direct electricity consumption per capita was computed by multiplying the 
power ratings for each of the appliances by the intensity of use and the number of hours of 
electricity supplied. This value was normalized by household and neighborhood 
characteristics to minimize the effect of variations in neighborhood supply. I computed 
intensity of use for each appliance as shown in Table 3.1. Because household sizes varied by 
location, per capita electricity consumption was computed based on average household sizes 
for each neighborhood and city. 
With electricity consumption as a proxy for energy consumption, the per capita 
direct electricity requirement of households was used as a derived demand based on primary 
demand for other energy-consumptive goods such as electrical devices, corrected for 
intensity of use. Following standard economic theory, individuals were assumed to be utility 
Table 3.1.  Appliance ratings and intensity of use 
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maximizers subject to their budgetary constraints. The derived demand for total per capita 
electricity is a function of specific regional and demographic variables as represented in 
Equation 1. 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖𝛿𝑖𝜑𝑖)           (1) 
where 𝐸𝑖 refers to the total electricity consumption for the i
th person, 𝐴𝑖 refers to the 
appliance power rating, 𝛿𝑖 is a variable correcting for intensity of use, and 𝜑𝑖 is a function of 
the geographic location variable. 
The energy consumed per capita was computed as 
𝐸𝑖𝑘 = 𝜑𝑘
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝛿𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1
(∑ 𝑆𝑘
𝑛
1 )/𝑛𝑘
        `  (2) 
where 𝜑, S, and j are household demographic-variable coefficients. A description of each of 
the variables is provided in Table 3.2. The product 𝐴𝑖𝛿𝑖 computes the daily power 
consumption for each appliance such that 
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝛿𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1  =  𝐴1𝛿1 + 𝐴2𝛿2+ 𝐴3𝛿3 + ….+ 𝐴𝑗𝛿𝑗 ;      (3) 
where 𝐴𝑖 is represented by the dummy variables as listed in Table 3.3. 
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From this data, an energy consumption map was created for the cities in the study. 
Next I conducted two analyses using statistical evaluation to determine which factors affect 
the variation in total per capita household electricity requirements. In the first analysis, 
household income was correlated to the total electrical energy consumption using tables and 
graphs. The second analysis was a linear regression fit with average per capita electricity 
consumption as the dependent variable and household size as the independent variable.  
Table 3.2:  Variable definitions 
Table 3.3:  Dummy variable definitions 
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These analyses were adapted from the Specific Consumption Forecasting method as 
described by Bhattacharyya and Timilsina (2009). My model quantifies the relationship 
between household electricity consumption and economic variables, such as income and 
household dwelling characteristics, that might explain the variation in total per capita energy 
requirements in Nigerian households. 
3.2.3.2 Projecting electricity consumption to 2050 
Next, with projections of 100% electrification based on intensity of use, simulations 
were run for three scenarios: low-energy consumer, high-energy consumer, and optimal 
energy use. The low-energy and high-energy consumption scenarios were based on 
household consumption in the locations we surveyed. The optimal-energy use scenario was 
based on qualitative data on what would be considered a “decent” standard of living in an 
energy-secure system.  
Computing optimal energy use 
This standard used the average household size I had computed for the southwestern 
region, to model the following household demographics as optimal for a base-case energy 
secure household: the average household size of 5.1 persons, living in a 5 room home (2 
bedrooms, living room, kitchen, and indoor bathroom) with electricity requirements to 
power five light bulbs, a refrigerator, three fans, a television, a radio, a DVD player, an iron, 
a two-plate electric cooker7, as well as to power other household productive services at 
sunset. The energy requirement for each person is a function of household needs as 
presented in Equation 3. 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑆)           (4) 
                                                 
7 Qualitative data indicated that households prefer an electric cooker over the open flame of a gas burner 
stove. 
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where 𝐸𝑖 refers to the total electricity consumption for the i
th person, 𝐴𝑖 refers to the 
appliance rating, 𝑡𝑖 is a variable for intensity of use, and 𝑆 is a function of household size. 
The model is of the form: 
𝐸𝑖 =
∑ 𝐴𝑗𝑡𝑗
∞
𝑗
𝑆
          (5) 
This computed value for per capita end-use energy is proposed as the minimal 
energy poverty line. 
Projecting future energy needs 
The projections for these three scenarios were used to determine the total name-
plate capacity generation required to provide for the Nigerian population’s residential 
electricity needs from 1980 to 2050. With population projections for Nigeria as the 
independent variable and total household electricity needs as the dependent variable, plots 
were created to determine electricity supply based on population growth. These plots were 
compared to current energy generation.  
While these estimates are specific to Nigeria’s population, they are applicable to most 
of sub-Saharan Africa which has similar climate, nutrition and dietary products, and value 
systems. Increase in affluence directly translates to an increase in electricity consumption, 
more so than would be expected in the traditional ascension of the energy ladder from 
traditional fuels to modern energy. It would be quite normal for individuals to forgo 
payment of rent in the purchase of electronic gadgetry and be effectively homeless.  
I also compared historic generation of some sub-Saharan West African countries to the 
proposed energy poverty line. 
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Figure 3.2: Per capita average annual energy consumption in urban southwestern Nigeria. 
Source: Author  
 
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Mapping Urban Electricity Consumption 
The per capita electricity consumed is represented in Equation 2, where 𝐸𝑖 refers to 
the total electricity consumption for the ith person, 𝐴𝑖 refers to the appliance power rating, 𝛿𝑖 
is a variable correcting for intensity of use, and 𝜑𝑖 is a function of the geographic location 
variable. 𝐸𝑖𝑘 = 𝜑𝑘
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝛿𝑖
𝑗
0
(∑ 𝑆𝑘
𝑛
0 )/𝑛𝑘
         (2) 
where 𝜑, S, and j are household demographic variable coefficients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The energy consumed per capita was mapped for the states of Lagos, Osun, and Oyo 
(Fig 3.2). Lagos Island was found to use the most energy per capita (?̅? = 3148.2kWh); the 
regional average was nearly 1000 kWH lower at 2255.5kWh per capita. The disparity in the 
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consumption per capita for Lagos Island is due to the fact that it has more electricity supply. 
It is Nigeria’s major economic, social, and financial center, and as such it has a more 
developed and extensive electricity generation, transmission, and distribution network 
(Abiodun, 1997). 
3.3.2 No Correlation between Income, Household Size, and Electricity Access 
For the southwestern geopolitical zone, average annual household energy 
consumption was 2255.5 kWh (Table 3.4). On average, households spent about 15% of 
household income on electricity expenses, annually. Larger households (with 6 or more 
persons) consumed, on average, 1482.8kWh annually, or 34% less than households of 
average size (5.1 persons), and about half (54%) of what smaller households (fewer than 5.1 
persons) consumed.  
 
To investigate this trend, a linear regression was carried out to determine whether 
annual household income had an impact on the total energy consumed. With average per 
capita electricity consumption as the dependent variable and household size as the 
independent variable, household income was found to be statistically relevant (p = 0.033).  
However, income differences only explained 4.3% of the variation in household energy-
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
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consumption habits, with a one dollar increase in income resulting in a 0.0246 kW increase 
in average annual household energy consumed. 
  Next, I used the Pearson correlation to determine whether there was a statistical 
relationship between household size and total electrical energy consumption. With r = -0.38, 
there was an inverse relationship between total household energy consumption and 
household size.  The more people in the household, the poorer the household and the fewer 
the number of appliances owned—thus, the less electricity consumed (see Table 3.5). 
However, this relationship was not sufficient to explain the effect of household size 
on total household energy consumption (R2 = 0.052).  Note that the average household 
income for households in the second and third consumption quartiles was more than double 
that of households in the first quartile. 
 
 
The qualitative data on the relationship between electricity costs and income support 
the results of the regression analysis of the relationship among income, household size, and 
total household energy consumption. The regression results may reflect the unavailability of 
formal credit services and the irregularity of income. The high costs and risks associated with 
lending to the poor and smaller business enterprises inhibit the creation of formal credit 
services; therefore, microfinance institutions (MFIs) are the primary source of loans.  
However, the high interest rates (21% to 42%) charged by MFIs prohibit borrowing 
funds for the purchase of personal electric and electronic appliances; these items are bought 
Table 3.5. Quartile Electricity Consumption Demographics  
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with MFI funds only when they will be used for entrepreneurial purposes (Anyanwu, 2004). 
Also, the poorer a household is, the less income available for purchasing electronics and 
gadgetry that contribute to electricity consumption. However, we cannot infer that that 
larger households, which are often multigenerational, are necessarily poorer. 
 
Table 3.6. Descriptives for dummy variables 
 
Unpredictability of income stems from two phenomena. First, for households in 
which the income earners are self-employed, income is seasonal, increasing during festive 
seasons or according to weather conditions. Secondly, many employers hold employee 
salaries in high-interest savings or certificate-of-deposit accounts for periods exceeding six 
months, so as to benefit from the interest accrued over time. This leaves households 
subsisting on traditional rotating savings and loan schemes (isusu) until salaries are paid. 
Seasonal incomes and salary holding contribute to uncertainty in the availability of 
household income, but they also create large bursts of disposable income when the salaries 
are finally paid or high season for the type of work done arrives. 
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The unavailability of formal credit services means that appliances, gadgetry, and all 
big-ticket items are purchased with cash. Living expenses such as rent are also paid in cash, 
and they are paid in advance for the year to come. Basic electronic and electric appliances are 
typically purchased during the large influxes of cash, and a majority of households in this 
study owned such big-ticket items as televisions (96%), refrigerators (75%), and generators 
(72%). The qualitative data indicates that possession of material goods is valued over 
investment in human capital in the form of nutrition, education, and basic infrastructure.   
3.3.3 Discrepancy in Household Electricity Consumption and Electricity Billing 
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Most households spent less than 25% of their monthly income on electricity (Fig 
3.3), including grid-supplied electricity and that from personal generators. Thus, with current 
tariff structures, households do not spend as much as has been expected on electrical energy. 
For a typical household of 5.1 persons and a $1,000-2,000 annual household income range, 
with electricity consumption of 2900kWh/cap-yr, the annual electricity costs are $369.75. 
This is equivalent to 36.5% of annual income. The discrepancy between the reported 23% of 
income paid and the actual electricity costs at 36% of household income is due to the fact 
that electricity bills are often not paid in full. Electricity is supplied as long as some minimum 
specified amount is paid. Therefore, families are able to afford to pay for electricity (when it 
is supplied). Nigeria’s power company is subsidized by the government, which creates the 
artificial pricing of electricity. Qualitative data also shows that households receive the same 
monthly bill for electricity, even if they have not had any power supply for the preceding 
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month or months, as the case may be. As such, electricity bills are an unreliable measure of 
actual electricity consumed. 
 
The current weighted average cost of electricity in Nigeria is 3.2USc/kWh, which is 
less than half the marginal cost of supply (Ikeme & Ebohon, 2004). The current pricing 
structure is supposed to be set according to building structure (residential, commercial, 
industrial, special, and street lighting). In the residential category, consumers are charged for 
electricity according to four tariff codes (R1-R4), which depend on the types of phase meters 
(one or three-phase meters) they use or are expected to use. For instance, for residential 
consumers classified as R1, 2014 monthly residential pricing tariffs for the Ibadan 
Figure 3.3 Electricity is not affordable for most urban Nigerian households 
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Distribution Company (DISCO) are fixed service charges of N0 ($0 US) and energy charges 
of N4/kWh(2.5 USc/kWh) (NERC, 2013).  
In reality, electricity pricing in Nigeria is often based on assumptions about electricity 
usage and building size rather than on actual consumption data from meters. In the field 
research, I found that larger single-family homes always had higher electricity bills than 
smaller, multi-family rental buildings. The electricity bill that is delivered at the end of the 
month is not based on the actual electricity usage, but rather on the utility company’s 
assumptions about the number and kind of appliances and the maximum number of people 
that any given type of residential unit is likely to have. The larger a home is, the more people 
are assumed to reside in it; the greater the number of people, the higher electricity 
consumption is expected to be. These assumptions about household electricity-use vary 
widely and are made at the discretion of the local electricity district officials of Nigeria’s 
federal electricity company (Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN)).  The fact that 
bills are based on assumed rather than actual use means that the current electricity pricing 
does not provide an accurate guide for what electricity pricing should in order for 
independent power producers to operate profitably, nor for what prices are affordable for 
the average consumer. 
Proposing a Minimum Energy Poverty Line 
Using the average household size in the southwestern region, I computed a minimal 
energy poverty line based on the average household size and modeled the following 
household demographics as optimal for a base-case energy-secure household:  5.1 persons 
living in a 5-room home (2 bedrooms, living room, kitchen, and indoor bathroom), with 
electricity requirements to power 5 light bulbs, a refrigerator, 3 fans, a television, a radio, a 2-
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plate electric cooker8, and other household productive services at sunset. The energy 
requirement for each person is a function of household needs as presented in Equation 3. 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑆)           (3) 
where 𝐸𝑖 refers to the total electricity consumption for the i
th person, 𝐴𝑖 refers to the 
appliance rating, 𝐻𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 are variables correcting for intensity of use, and 𝑆 is a function of 
household size. 
The model is of the form: 
𝐸𝑖 =
∑ 𝐴𝑗𝐻𝑗𝑡𝑗
∞
𝑗
𝑆
          (4) 
The computation yielded a minimal energy poverty line of 3068 kWh/cap-yr. This 
translates to ≈350W/cap-yr of continuously produced power to alleviate energy poverty. 
3.3.4 Forecasting Electricity Consumption by Consumer Type  
Simulations for high energy use and low energy use were run for three scenarios: low 
energy consumption, high energy consumption, and optimal energy consumption. The low 
energy use was based on the lowest-quartile energy consumption of 529.5 kWh and the high 
energy use was based on the third-quartile energy consumption of 6625.3 kWh. The optimal 
energy use line is the minimal energy poverty line of 3068 kWh. These three values were 
converted to power as 60.4W, 756W, and 350W per capita, respectively.  
                                                 
8 Qualitative data indicated that households prefer an electric cooker over the open flame 
of a gas burner stove. 
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The projections for these three scenarios were used to determine the total name-
plate capacity generation required to provide for the Nigerian population’s residential 
electricity needs from 1980 to 2050. 
 
 
Using the minimum consumption capacity as a benchmark, data shows that even if 
the entire country were comprised of low consumers, capacity generation in Nigeria from 
1980 to present would not have supplied enough power for the entire population (Figure 
3.4). Current electricity generation supplies only 31.3% of the energy required for minimal 
consumption, and only 9.7% of the energy required at the proposed minimum energy 
poverty line (Figure 3.5). The situation is similar in many sub-Saharan African countries: 
historical generation capacity falls below the low-consumer level (Figure 6). My simulations 
Figure 3.4 Projecting energy needs for urban southwestern Nigeria. 
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indicate that current installed capacity will have to increase eighteen-fold to supply adequate 
electrical power for Nigeria’s current population. Note that the simulation does not take into 
account efficiency upgrades in types of appliances, or the possibility of a sudden decline in 
population growth as industrialization occurs. It is a common trend for birth rates to 
decrease as affluence increases (Myrskylä et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Current generation capacity insufficient if entire population were low-consumers 
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Across the states, most household electricity consumption was between that of low-
consumers (less than 529.55 kWh/cap) and the Minimum Energy Poverty Line (MEPL of 
3068 kWh/cap) (fig 3.6). This exludes Lagos state which had an even distribution of 
households that were either at the MEPL range or higher.  
 
 
I also compared the historical electricity generation capacity of select sub-Saharan African 
countries and they all produced less electricity per capita to supply their populace even if 
everyone only consumed 529 kWh annually (Fig 3.7). 
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3.4 Discussion 
Most present-day energy models are based on the energy systems of industrialized 
states. However, developing states have different economies and energy choices. They 
typically lack credit systems and all purchases and financial transactions are made in cash. 
Low-density fuels (firewood, charcoal, oils) are the predominant fuels for cooking and 
lighting. While it is impractical to have a universal energy model or energy poverty line, the 
regions of the world that experience pervasive energy poverty need context-based energy 
poverty lines. 
My study used electricity for lighting, cooking, and other tasks at sunset as a proxy 
for energy needs. It proposes a minimal energy poverty line of 350W (3068 kWh/cap-yr) per 
capita to provide for basic needs in urban sub-Saharan Africa. My results indicate that there 
is no strong connection between income and electricity supply; the country simply produces 
Figure 3.7 Most West African countries name-plate capacity is insufficient for a low-
consumer population. 
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insufficient power to supply its population. However, I found that smaller households 
consumed much more electricity per household than larger ones.  The explanation for this 
finding may be that smaller households tend to be nuclear families, which implies that they 
are wealthy enough to house extended-family members in a separate location.  Wealthier 
households can afford to spend more on consumer electronics, the use of which increases 
electricity consumption. 
If the country were comprised of individuals who all consumed little energy (low-
consumers), households would be able to use energy to add value to informal-sector 
production; the informal sector provides 50 percent of employment in urban areas in sub-
Saharan Africa (Meagher & Mohammed-Bello, 1996). For this reason, residential power 
supply is of utmost importance.  
At the minimum energy poverty line of 3068 kWh/cap-yr proposed in this article, 
electricity costs would approach 25% of total household income. This is considered a high 
proportion of income to be spent on utilities; Boardman (1991) proposes that utility costs 
should be less than 10 percent of household income. Full electrification would make the 
country attractive to external investors, and their investments would, in turn, increase 
employment and the standard of living. This in turn would be expected to lower the 
proportion of household income spent on electricity by increasing average household 
income due to increased employment opportunities. Increases in employment and standard 
of living would make electricity increasingly affordable.   
The model developed here omits air conditioners and climate control electronics in 
the computation of the minimal poverty line.  However, it can easily be adapted to include 
the increase in affluence that would make their use a norm. However, at the unit cost of 
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electricity and name-plate capacity generation that currently exists, passive cooling and 
heating strategies such as building design and adaptive behavior would prove more effective. 
Nigeria was chosen as a case study because of its unique position as an energy-rich 
country that nevertheless experiences pervasive energy poverty. Nigeria is an oil-producing 
state that has large deposits of natural gas; associated gas flares have been burning for over 
fifty years. Crude-oil deposits are found within impermeable layers of earth strata in 
combination with natural gas. During mining, the associated gas is vented and flared, as a 
safety precaution to minimize the occurrence of explosions during installation of extraction 
equipment. In oil deposits that have significant natural-gas repositories, infrastructure is 
installed to capture and convey the gas away from the site. 
Capturing gas flares presents a unique opportunity to generate electricity from 
thermal power generation plants. While doing so would seem to fly in the face of the 
argument against fossil fuel combustion because of climate change concerns, Nigeria’s 
current gas-flaring already accounts for one third of all anthropogenic carbon-dioxide 
emissions from flaring (Marland et al., 2005). Capturing energy from gas flaring makes much 
more sense than not doing so.  
An energy system riddled with energy poverty produces negative feedbacks, which 
are evident in Nigeria as well as other sub-Saharan African countries with underdeveloped 
electricity grid infrastructure. Low electricity tariffs create low returns on investment. The 
low returns mean that there are limited funds for re-investing in the energy system, 
specifically for infrastructure for transmission and distribution. They also mean that there are 
limited resources for preventing infrastructure theft and vandalism. Institutional capacity is 
limited and characterized by a lack of transparency in policy-making and enforcement. There 
is little information about exactly how energy is distributed across the grid. 
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To address these problems, sub-Saharan African countries are considering the 
decentralization and privatization of electrical power supply. To make this feasible, 
independent power producers (IPPs) need to know how much electricity they will need to 
generate to adequately supply power to their customers. IPPs also need information on the 
cost of producing and distributing electricity so that they can charge appropriate tariffs 
(subject to approval of the country’s energy regulatory commission).  To date, such 
information is nonexistent; without it, there can be no transparency for those who might 
invest in the electricity sector.  
The model presented here can be used to determine how much electricity is needed 
by a given population.  For example, suppose than an IPP is contracted to supply power to 
the administrative jurisdiction of Ibadan North, which encompasses Agbowo and Bodija, 
with a total population of 308,119. At the minimum energy poverty line of 350W per capita, 
the minimum installed capacity required would be 108MW. Since the model compensates for 
residential load peak time, it is appropriate for computing minimal name-plate capacity for 
residential and mixed-use neighborhoods, but not for strictly zoned commercial areas.  By 
applying the model, the IPP can gauge the appropriate generation capacity for Ibadan North, 
the amount of fuel needed to run the power plant, the costs associated with purchasing, 
installing, and maintaining the plant, and therefore, the tariffs it will be necessary to charge. 
 
3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Most recommendations for addressing energy poverty, and more broadly electricity 
supply, in sub-Saharan Africa assume that changes to top-down institutional structures will 
fix problems in the energy system. They do not address how the changes will be 
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accomplished or what the minimum targets for power generation should be. This paper 
presents a context-specific method of computing per capita energy needs based on 
consumption data collected in the region, in order to simulate realistic scenarios for an 
energy-secure future in Nigeria. 
There is no clarity as to how affordable electricity will be, as governments in sub-
Saharan West Africa consider disaggregating electricity production and distribution. The 
electricity system must be restructured so that independent power producers can generate 
enough power to meet actual demand with a price structure that reflects this demand, is 
profitable for investors, and affordable for consumers.  
The Specific Consumption Forecasting method I used in this study is applicable for 
sub-Saharan Africa because the region has low installed electricity capacity, which in turn 
means that there is not enough capacity for a correlation between income, household size, 
and household electricity consumption to exist. However, if installed capacity increases and 
electricity consumption and expenditures become bounded by household budgetary 
constraints, a more complex forecasting method such as Artificial Neural Networks would 
be needed.  
Future research will be focused on expanding the spatial scope of this research to 
increase the sample size and determine if the trends found in this work are strengthened, as 
well as to compare other geographical regions for homogeneity in results. 
3.5.1 Renewable Energy Portfolios in SSA 
It is important to note that in the energy poverty literature, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, renewable energy is often associated with distributed generation and off-grid 
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infrastructure for providing electricity in rural areas. This narrow scope impacts how 
renewables are considered in national electricity generation portfolios in SSA. 
Africa has had significant challenges in providing electricity: it houses 13% of the 
world’s population, produces 3% of its electricity with less than 30% of its population 
having access (Global Data, 2014). In the discourse on providing electricity to escape energy 
poverty, as well as with concerns of climate change, renewable energy sources need to play a 
more prominent role in the national electricity generation mix. Solar PV, geothermal, wind, 
hydro, and biogas have proven to be more easily adaptable for sub-Saharan Africa. Of these 
five energy sources, hydrothermal power is considered a ‘traditional’ form of electricity: it is 
one of the oldest and well-established forms of electricity generation. Most countries in SSA 
that have large rivers (Angola, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, for example) have had 
hydroelectric power stations producing a significant portion of their electricity. Nigeria, for 
instance, has 10 hydro power stations operational, with smaller- and medium-sized plants 
planned in conjunction with multi-national entities.  
In addition, there has been success with non-hydro renewable energy technologies 
including geothermal (Ethiopia and Kenya), solar PV/CSP (Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa), 
wind (Angola, South Africa), and biogas/waste (South Africa, Sudan) with current plans in 
the works for additional non-hydro power plants. There are significant challenges associated 
with increasing the proportion of electricity generated by these renewable technologies in 
SSA. There is an abundance of literature on the capacity of electricity that can be generated 
by renewable technologies across SSA, however, there is a dire need for the technical 
workforce needed to keep these relatively new technologies operational. Excluding countries 
like South Africa, there is limited buy-in for non-traditional renewable technologies (i.e. non-
hydro). These include, but are not limited to local manufacturing of replacement parts for 
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these technologies. Issues related to dispatchability and intermittence must be factored in in 
designing an electricity portfolio mix that is sustainable.  
A viable energy system requires a trained and skilled technical workforce, updated 
and adequately maintained physical infrastructure, and secure distribution and transmission 
systems. Without these, it would be difficult to meet the energy needs of the population, 
even if it were comprised entirely of low-energy consumers. 
An adequate supply of affordable, reliable electricity is not just the first, but a crucial 
step out of the cycle of extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The informal sector 
contributes half of the economy of the region’s countries, and residential electricity supply, 
which includes energy for added value to production, is essential to empower individual and 
grassroots initiatives to escape from extreme poverty. Home-based cottage industries, such 
as food production and storage, for instance, need a reliable power source in order to 
operate, much less grow. Otherwise these industries cannot develop to the point that they 
can make a significant enough contribution to the economy to alleviate poverty. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN INDICATOR-BASED SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY: BENCHMARKS FOR PRIVATIZING NIGERIA’S ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR 
Abstract 
In light of privatization efforts in Nigeria’s electricity sector, this paper proposes a transition 
management strategy that focuses on how to create, promote, and manage these transitions 
sustainably within the context of current user practices, business models, and governance 
institutions of the Nigerian electricity system. It specifies the relevant benchmarks in 
electricity governance within the themes of social, economic, environmental and institutional 
elements for system shift to sustainable production and consumption.  It thus contributes to 
the knowledge-base of decision-support tools for addressing the complex issue of energy 
poverty due to the interface of its technology-policy-behavior elements. 
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Executive Summary 
Countries across sub-Saharan Africa are currently pursuing privatization and 
decentralization of their electricity sectors which have traditionally been vertically integrated 
utilities, responsible for producing, transmitting, distributing, and setting tariff structures in 
electricity. There is expectation that an economic model for the electricity sector will 
minimize inefficiencies, however because utilities like the electricity sector function most 
efficiently as monopolies, it has the potential to be abused by incumbent power generating 
and distributing companies. Also, there are limited codified policies and strategies with 
quantifiable benchmarks to measure success of privatization transition efforts. 
This study proposes a transition management strategy that focuses on how to create, 
promote, and manage these transitions sustainably within the context of current user 
practices, business models, and governance institutions of the Nigerian electricity system. It 
specifies the relevant measurable benchmarks in electricity governance within the themes of 
social, economic, environmental and institutional elements.  
It is a long-term management strategy that incorporates lessons learned in the 
transition, as well as stakeholder input. It is expected to be periodically re-evaluated to 
ensure that transitions are sustainable so that it serves as a useful decision-support tool for 
energy policy. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Energy is important for the economic, social, and developmental competitiveness of 
any nation (Alam et al., 1997). While it is not explicitly listed as part of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) it is clearly necessary to achieve those goals for the provision 
of basics like food, clean water, shelter, health and educational services (WEC, 1999; Toman 
and Lemelkova, 2003).   
Similarly, energy is an indicator of social and development progress, the greater the 
level of energy security of a given country, the higher its Human Development Index 
ranking (Barett, 2000). Thus the discourse on energy poverty is based on the premise that 
poverty in a society is unacceptable and extends to dimensions beyond income – 
malnutrition, dependency, social and geographical isolation, illiteracy, lack of electricity, lack 
of income, vulnerability to natural disasters, and civil unrest (Pereira et al., 2011).  
Energy poverty is the most pressing challenge facing developing countries (Sagar, 
2005) and this is especially true for developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa where energy 
poverty is tied to economic development and environmental sustainability, amongst other 
social issues (Wolde-Rufael, 2005). In addition, the region currently has, and is projected to 
have the greatest number of people without access to electricity by 2030 (Shäfer et al., 2011). 
The bulk of electricity research in developing nations is focused on decentralized 
rural electricity access using renewable energy sources (Mohammed et al., 2013; Alfaro & 
Miller, 2014; Chaurey & Kandpal, 2010). This is because majority of the energy poor -85%- 
are in the rural areas of developing and emerging economies (Shäfer et al., 2011). Less 
attention has been paid to decentralization of the vertical utility monopoly as many nations 
in sub-Saharan Africa attempt to address the dearth of electricity supply by privatizing the 
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national grid. This is especially important because the population density of the energy poor 
is higher in urban than in rural areas, and rural-to-urban migration trend is expected to 
increase over the next 30 years (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(a)). 
While technologically mature, best practice examples in main-grid electricity 
decentralization, such as the Dutch transition that incorporated distributed generation 
(Verbong & Geels, 2007) or transitions to low-carbon generation such as the case of 
Ontario, Canada (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014) to name a few, might not be easily 
transferable to regional and cultural contexts in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
Some of these contexts include disparity in the skills of operations and maintenance 
staff from those in the industrialized nations; destruction of implemented technologies 
because of lack of familiarity with the technology; and sometimes users not having complete 
information on the capacity and proper use of installed systems. Thus the sustainable 
transition to a privatized electricity system needs to be managed with these limitations in 
mind. 
The closest analogue for national-grid electricity decentralization in sub-Saharan 
Africa is the case of South Africa with similar development timelines and technical 
limitations at inception. However, the power dynamics due to segregation minimize the 
similarities in the governance institution landscape (Bekker et al., 2008) such that South 
Africa is not a best practice model for other developing SSA countries. Thus SSA countries 
look to examples other rapidly developing economies, such as India, to guide 
decentralization of the national grid at the regional level. 
As the most populous country in Africa, and the largest oil exporting nation in SSA, 
Nigeria is in a unique position of being a resource-rich country with an energy-poor 
populace (CIA, 2015).  Nigeria has enough energy resources that it supplies the neighboring 
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countries of Ghana, Benin, and Togo with natural gas to fuel their thermal electricity plants 
(Khennas, 2012). Considering that most of the energy-poor reside in SSA, and the recent 
move to privatization of its national grid, a sustainable transition strategy is important to 
prevent adverse outcomes of privatization.  
This paper uses the Transformatory Sustainability Research (TSR) framework as a 
holistic way of addressing energy poverty in the form of electricity access. Using transition 
management theory within the context of the TSR framework, this paper specifies the 
relevant benchmarks in electricity governance within the themes of social, economic, 
environmental and institutional elements for system shift to sustainable production and 
consumption. 
The Nigerian electricity sector is currently in a state of flux as it proceeds with the 
decentralization of its various systems. For this reason, there is limited information on actual 
changes that have come about due to these dynamics. This discourse will be limited to the 
history and current state of its performance as a vertically integrated utility as well as 
suggestions for adapting new knowledge and strategies for monitoring at the meso-scale and 
macro-scale for a sustainable transition. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Socio-technical systems like the energy sector function as a result of the operation of 
the technical system within the context of rules and institutions as defined by the 
interpretation of those rules by the relevant actors (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(b)). Socio-
technical transitions, as such, are a set of processes that create an integral shift in socio-
technical systems (Markard, 2012). According to Makard (2012), these changes extend not 
just to the existing technical system, but other domains such as production and trade, as well 
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as planning and policy making. Most importantly, the interpretation of sustainability is 
subjective and changes over time (Garud et al., 2010). 
Sustainability transitions are a coevolution of the economic, cultural, and institutional 
landscape of a society, causing radical change (Pesch, 2015). However, since socio-technical 
systems are highly intertwined with user practices and life styles, value chains, institutional 
structures and political structures, changes are incremental rather than radical (Rip and 
Kemp, 1998; Dosi, 1982; Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2010) which go in the face of 
contemporary sustainability challenges (Markard et al., 2012). In the electricity sector, these 
sustainability transitions involve not just a transition from fossil- and nuclear-fueled 
generation to renewable energy sources (Foxon et al., 2005; Stephens & Jiusto, 2010), but 
also the appropriate infrastructure to accommodate a decentralized smart grid (Fox-Penner, 
2010). 
Geels and Schot (2007) propose four ways transitions occur: transformation 
precipitated by external pressure; reconfiguration due to maturity of niche innovation 
technology in solving internal problems in the system; technological substitution of the stabilized 
mature niche innovations; and re-alingment and de-alignment stemming from major 
destabilization of the existing regime leading to systemic collapse of the technical system. 
In the field of electricity generation there is a wealth of literature pertaining to these different 
transition typologies: high energy efficiency in the Dutch electricity system, a form of 
reconfiguration transition ((Hadjilambrinos, 2000); transformation transitions due to the 
external pressure of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol leading to an increase in 
renewable energy percentages in the electricity portfolio of many western nations (Haas et 
al., 2011); electric trams replacing horse-drawn trams in Europe and the United States, an 
illustration of a technological substitution transition due to maturity of technology (Geels 
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&Schot, 2007). The substitution of electric trams for their horse-drawn counterparts is also a 
form of re-alingment and de-alignment stemming from major destabilization of the 
transportation status-quo. 
According to Geels & Schot (2007), the types of landscape developments that 
influence these socio-technical transitions include emergence of new markets, population 
growth, and economic growth amongst others. Change evolves slowly and the responses of 
the actors to these external pressures with internal resources determine which of the 
aforementioned transition pathways occur. If the landscape stays intact, this becomes a 
transformation transition type; if the changes in the system create architectural changes, this 
is a reconfiguration transition; if substitution niche technology is sufficiently matured to 
replace the current system this becomes a technological substitution transition; if 
substitution niche technology is not mature, there will be multiple innovations that develop, 
co-exist, and die until such a time as one option becomes dominant, creating a re-alingment 
and de-alignment transition. In every one of these instances agency is important in triggering 
the transition pathway. 
Budde et al. (2012) argue that actors act based on expectations even when operating 
under similar circumstances of resources and institutional context. These expectations at the 
landscape level can range from climate change to globalization and inform the dynamics at 
the regime and niche levels.  
Actors in the electricity socio-technical system include policymakers and public 
authorities, as well as public and industry actors. Policymakers and public authorities 
traditionally finance the electricity system and the initial phase of innovation (Berkhout, 
2006).  In developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the shortage of electricity 
supply frames the expectations of the relevant actors at the landscape level with emphasis on 
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globalization. Sometimes, sustainability transitions are defined by the ontological context of 
the actors and can unintentionally create or sustain systemic problems (Schuitmaker, 2012).  
For this reason, sustainability transitions are ongoing processes as opposed to pre-defined 
regime shifts (Markard, 2012). The temporal nature of sustainability transitions requires a 
reflexive and iterative methodology for operability. Transition management creates this kind 
of oversight by providing a management strategy for public decision-makers and private 
actors based on a philosophy that attempts to mitigate uncertainty and complexity (Rotmans, 
2001).  
Rotmans (2001) describes transition management as having the following 
characteristics: it entails long-term (25 years or more) considerations in shaping short-term 
policy, it is multi-domain with multi-level interactions involving multiple actors, and focuses 
on continuous learning from the ongoing outcomes of the transitions. It also considers a 
large number of options and allows for system innovation alongside system improvement. 
Transition management is initiated with consensus on a vision which needs to be multi-
dimensional and not just quantitative (Rotmans et al., 2001). It involves long-term thinking 
as a framework for shaping policy in the short- and medium-term, encompasses multiple 
domains, actors, and scale, and is a reflexive and iterative process.  
Transitions, which typically span a generation (25 years), experience periods of both 
slow and fast development. According to Rotmans et al. (2001), there are four transition 
phases:  (i) a pre-development phase in which there is no visible change in the status quo; (ii) 
a take-off phase where innovation processes and technologies begin to destabilize the system 
and the process of change initiates; (iii) an acceleration phase due to the accumulation of 
innovations in socio-cultural, economic, and institutional domain which reach with each 
other and are facilitated by collective learning, diffusion, and embedding; and finally, (iv) a 
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stabilization phase in which the speed of social change decreases and a new dynamic 
equilibrium is reached. 
The speed with which transitions occur and the dynamics and pathways of 
transformation depend on the adaptability of actors and institutions, as well as their 
capability to anticipate, adopt, and integrate new technology, knowledge, and practices 
(Dolata, 2009). Sustainability science by definition takes a holistic approach that factors in 
the dynamic interactions between the socio-ecological parts of the system. These interactions 
are based on the social, economic, and environmental elements of sustainability which are all 
linked via governance institutions (Sharma & Balachandra, 2015). Ignoring one or more 
elements of this dynamic system will lead to perverse outcomes in a best-case scenario, and 
eventual system collapse in a worst-case scenario. 
Studies in sustainable transitions in electricity and energy seek to understand how the 
introduction and development of renewable technologies can be promoted (Normann, 2015; 
van der Schoor & Scholtens, 2015; Sgouridis et al., 2013). These range from biofuels to solar 
PV, and wind. The onus of these initiatives is climate change thereby focusing only on 
environmental sustainability. Thus, while the ultimate aim for a sustainable energy system is 
one which energy is provided with minimum impact on the environment, producing a vital 
economy within the context of social equity, there is a chasm between the current state of 
energy systems in developing nations and this ultimate vision. Often these initiatives are 
well-meaning: in 2013 the U.S.-led initiative, Power Africa, was launched by President Barak 
Obama to increase power generation in Africa by adding 10,000 MW of cleaner, more 
efficient generation capacity in more than 19 African countries (The White House, 2013).  
The Power Africa project addresses the installation and upfront operation of these 
renewable energy power plants but fail to delve into causes of energy governance failure. 
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Studies indicate that for both these renewable electricity power plants and the traditional 
power plants (hydro, thermal), energy management culture and the lack of human capital are 
the cause of system failure. There is no knowledge of what the baseload should be as there is 
no research conducted on electricity consumption. This in turn implies that name-plate 
capacity for power plants is a guesstimate. This affects the distribution network leading to 
brown-outs and failure within the transmission network. These factors are exacerbated by an 
engineering culture in which cheaper non-compatible components are interfaced within the 
installations jeopardizing the structural and mechanical integrity of the system (Adeyemo, 
2013). There is also a lack of educated and trained technical personnel equipped to run and 
maintain these installations. In the case of these new renewable energy systems, these 
symptoms have already begun to manifest as in the case of the solar electrification project in 
Onisowo, Lagos state, Nigeria and similar projects in the other states of Zamfara, Bauchi, 
Benue, Bayelsa and Rivers that all experience problems with efficiency and maintenance 
(Oirere, 2014). This is further compounded by the fact that non-hydro renewables are for 
the most part completely novel technologies, and all resources need to be imported: from 
solar panels to technicians. It does not bode well for the sustainability of these projects. 
Sustainability science is place-based, incorporating knowledge of cross-scale 
challenges and scaling up from the local problem to the global issues (Kates et al., 2001; 
Clark and Dickson, 2003; Komiyama and Takeuchi, 2006). For this reason, sustainable 
energy transitions must also be place-based. This paper proposes a multi-level indicator-
based transition management strategy in the transition from an energy-poor system to an 
energy-secure one and eventually a sustainable system. 
Transition objectives are formed visions of the relevant stakeholders and have 
practical applications outside the realm of science. This paper focuses on how to create, 
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promote, and manage these transitions sustainably within the context of current user 
practices, business models, and governance institutions of the Nigerian electricity system and 
thus contribute to the knowledge-base of decision-support tools for addressing the complex 
issue of energy poverty due to the interface of its technology-policy-behavior elements. 
4.3 Research Design and Methodology 
Sustainability problems encompass different magnitudes of scales (temporal, scalar, 
and functional), multiple dynamics, multiple actors, and multiple system faults (Reitan, 2005). 
This paper limits the scope to Nigeria’s national electricity system, the actors within that 
system, and the inadequate supply of electrical power within the system.  
The electricity system is Nigeria is on the cusp of a re-alingment and de-alingment 
form of transition due to the collapse of the system. It exhibits the classic symptoms of this 
form of transition as outlined by Verbong and Geels (2010): there is insufficient production 
of electricity, massive infrastructure collapse, loss of faith by actors, as well as a sustained 
period of uncertainty filled in by experimentation with self-generation9 and renewables as 
distributed generation (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(b)). In order to understand the current state, 
propose sustainable visions, and manage the transitions from the current state to the desired 
future state, this paper uses Sustainability Transition Management within the 
Transformational Sustainability Research to create indicator-based transition 
management strategies to ensure quantifiable sustainable transitions. 
Qualitative data used for visioning was collected via participatory research in order to 
gather an understanding of lived experiences as a group or at the individual level (Silverman, 
2006). Qualitative data helps to understand the subtle nuances of the state of energy poverty 
                                                 
9 Self generation refers to individual household utilizing portable gasoline-powered generators for 
electricity production. 
  118 
within its context and reduce the distrust of the people being studied (Macaulay et al., 1999, 
pg. 774). It also helped to understand social actor’s perspectives, as well as validate data 
obtained from other sources (Londof, 1995).  
Both theoretical conceptual frameworks and data collection methodology are 
subsequently discussed. 
4.3.1 Transformational Sustainability Research (TSR) framework 
Transformational Sustainability Research (TSR) is a solutions-oriented framework to 
develop and test sustainable transition strategies through co-production of knowledge and 
solutions among scientists, policy-makers, and stakeholders (Wiek & Childers, 2010). TSR 
has three components – (i) a problem analysis that generates knowledge of the current state, 
past developments and contemporary dynamics to determine causation; (ii) crafting of 
sustainable visions via scenario-construction for possible future states; and (iii) intervention 
planning that develops transition pathways as well as intervention strategies from possible 
critical tipping points and irreversible trajectories (points-of-no-return), to the sustainable 
vision (Fig 4.1).  
4.3.1.1 Problem analysis 
This element of the framework seeks to answer the following questions: what does 
energy poverty in Nigeria look like today? Why is there energy poverty in Nigeria? Who are 
the actors at the different scales within the electricity system? How do they act? How do 
these actions affect the system?  
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This information would help gain an understanding of the current state and craft 
sustainable visions through participation of the relevant stakeholders, from policy makers to 
the energy poor, while taking into account the complexity of different perspectives, values, 
preferences, and types of evidence.  
Defining the system boundaries 
The first step in answering these questions in the case study area is to define the 
system. This is done by defining the boundaries, its components, and the interactions of 
those components as relates to the problem (Remington-Doucette, 2013).  
The boundaries of this problem encompass spatial, temporal, and functional 
dimensions. The spatial boundary under consideration is geographic, limited by the physical 
infrastructure of the Nigerian national electricity grid. Document analysis of relevant reports, 
as well as historical archival documents from the National Electric System Operator (NESO) 
Figure. 4.1 Transformatory Sustainability Research (TSR) framework, adapted from 
Wiek & Childers, 2010. 
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were used to create the organizational map of the vertically integrated system, as well as the 
new privatized system. 
The temporal scale covers the time period in which the electricity system was a 
vertically integrated public utility, from 1950 to 2014 (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(a)). Data from 
literature reviews from an academic journal database as well as publicly available historical 
archival documents were used. 
Current state of energy poverty 
Nigeria’s electricity system will be specified within its spatial, temporal, and 
functional scale. Qualitative data from participatory research as well as quantitative 
information from literature reviews of urban electricity consumption in the region will be 
used to supply this information. 
Actors and their interactions 
Actors within the electricity socio-technical system are often broadly categorized into 
producers and suppliers (Parag & Janda, 2014). In this paper, the producers extend to the 
generation, transmission, distribution, and regulatory entities, while the consumers refer to 
the households, cottage industries and larger manufacturing and production facilities. Data 
from the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) will be used to illustrate the 
connections as well as feedback loops amongst the actors in this electricity system.  
4.3.1.2 Sustainable Visions 
Sustainability science relies heavily on stakeholder engagement for bridging gaps 
between research and practice, addressing social and environmental justice for capability 
building (Cargo, 2008). Through participation of the relevant stakeholders, from policy 
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makers, to the energy poor, this vision takes into account the complexity of different 
perspectives, values, preferences, and types of evidence (Wiek & Childers, 2010). For 
instance, in sub-Saharan West Africa, the past is more important than the present, and the 
present than the future. This value system must be acknowledged, and the limitations it 
presents in crafting future scenarios would require the sustainability scientist to challenge 
cultural assumptions, decoupling vision crafters from previous mental models.  
Visioning exercises were conducted to answer the questions pertaining to a desirable, 
sustainable vision for energy security as well as the relevant short, medium, and long term 
benchmarks. It was up to the researcher to determine if the proposed visions met sustainability 
visions quality criteria based on Gibson’s core generic criteria for sustainability (Wiek & 
Iwaniec, 2013; Gibson, 2006).  Each visioning session lasted for an hour. 
4.3.1.3 Transition Strategies 
Transition strategies to the desired sustainable vision incorporate setting goal-oriented 
benchmarks, learning from unanticipated problems, continuous monitoring, evaluation for 
integrating new knowledge, and social adaptation (Grunwald, 2007).  A “backcasting” 
approach is normally used to determine the steps from the desired vision to the transition 
strategy. However, the absolute paucity of electricity supply inhibits this process. Moreover, 
this study is focused on transitions with immediate adaptability. These transitions will be 
informed by the qualitative and quantitative visioning benchmarks to tie practice-oriented 
steps to governance approaches by proposing criteria with which to measure performance 
sustainability of the proposed transitions. 
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4.3.2 Sustainable Transition Management 
There are four requirements of transition management: knowledge generation, 
integration, adaptation and transdisciplinarity (Wiek et al., 2006). 
The types of knowledge generated include information on the system current state 
and causation, guiding knowledge on visions, norms, and preferences, and transformatory 
knowledge pertaining to strategies, political and economic constraints as well as conflicts 
(Dortmans & Eiffe, 2004; Wilkinson & Cary, 2002).  
Once the transition phase has initiated, spurred on by the de-alignment and re-
alignment in the system, knowledge is integrated into the planning phase that includes goal-
formation, analyses, assessments, and strategy building. Next, system changes shape the 
transition by introducing new knowledge that is adapted and the transition process 
transforms after its first iteration from a “learning by planning” type to a synthesis of 
“learning by planning” and “learning by doing” (Fig 4.2). Finally for the transition to be 
successful it must include various stakeholders, from scientists and experts to individual and 
governance stakeholders at the different levels (Wiek et al., 2006). 
A reflexive and iterative method is proposed to evaluate the sustainability of the 
transition process, checking to see if the short-, medium-, and long-term electricity 
consumption goals have been met, and creating intervention point strategies to deal with 
unrealized benchmarks while adapting new knowledge. 
Within the social, economic, environmental and institutional elements of a 
sustainable transition qualitative and quantitative benchmarks give measurable progress on 
which to assess the success of the transition. 
Drawing from previous work done by Sharma & Balachandra (2015), Shortall et al. 
(2015), and Vithayasrichareon (2012), a multi-level indicator-based framework is proposed to 
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evaluate progress in the transition by specifying indicators in the social, economic, 
environmental, and institutional dimensions of the electricity system.  
 
 
4.3.3 Data Collection 
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Arizona State 
University. Qualitative data was compiled from focus groups, group interviews, and expert 
interviews which were conducted at the Federal University of Ibadan in Oyo state, Nigeria. 
Eligibility criteria included residency in Oyo state and fluency in the English language. 
Participant selection for both focus groups and group interviews were conducted with the 
purpose of ensuring that the research question would be addressed, while including some 
participant diversity, thus allowing for a range of participant points of view (Saldana, 2009). 
Fig 4.2 Assessing progress in sustainability transitions using indicators  
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Recruitment for focus groups, group interviews, and expert interviews was 
accomplished via chain sampling.  The researcher initiated prospective stakeholders to 
participate and make recommendations for additional candidate that fit the research criteria 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).  
All candidates consented to expert interviews, group interviews, and focus group 
sessions after receiving in-person description of the study and their prospective roles. Due to 
subtle cultural nuances that influence power dynamics, three separate sets of group 
interviews as well as focus groups were conducted: with adult members of the public across 
gender, income, education levels, and  ethnolinguistic affiliations; graduate students at the 
federal university; and faculty at the federal university. 
The focus groups sessions were semi-structured, allowing for guided but 
unconstrained conversations. Focus groups were conducted to ascertain the local vision of 
energy security, specific to electricity supply. The primary purpose was to stimulate 
discussion in line with the described research approach. Focus group sessions lasted for 
approximately 45 minutes with 15 participants per group, achieving saturation when no new 
themes emerged. 
Similarly, group interviews were semi-structured and pertained to lived experiences 
of lack of electricity supply. Saturation occurred when no new analytical insights were 
gleaned; group interview size was 15 participants and sessions ran for approximately one 
hour. 
In these group settings, the researcher took measures to minimize gender bias as 
much as possible, as well as “false” consensus from dominating participants (Litosseliti 2003 
pp 22).  
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These were complemented by qualitative interviews with experts in Nigeria’s energy 
sector. For the purpose of this study, experts refer to Nigerian nationals who are 
professionals in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. This study limits the scope to those who have 
represented the country at national and international level deliberations such as the NNPC, 
the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Department for International Development 
(DFID). For expert interviews, questions were more in-depth, eliciting information on the 
actor networks and the physical electricity grid. Interviews lasted for roughly 40 minutes 
each.  
Due to the unique nature and scope of the topic, saturation occurred quickly and 
saturation size was achieved at 15 participants for group interviews and 5 participants for 
expert interviews (Bertaux, 1981; Morse 2000 pp 4) (See Appendix B for coding 
methodology). 
Before integrating qualitative and quantitative data, each dataset was analyzed and 
interpreted separately according to the process described by Rosenberg et al. (2013). Next, 
general themes were identified and coded based on relationship to quantitative data 
collected. Finally the information extracted was used to inform gaps in literature review and 
quantitative data collected. 
4.4 Results 
The current state of energy poverty is briefly described in terms of the country’s 
history and enabling institutions, coded themes of lived experiences, as well as actor 
networks in the electricity system to give context to the state of electricity supply. The results 
of visioning exercises in determining local perspectives of sufficient electricity supply are 
contrasted with literature on electricity supply in relation to levels of development. Finally 
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within the context of current user practices, business models, and governance institutions of 
the Nigerian electricity system, indicators that are appropriate for a sustainable transition are 
specified as benchmarks for practice-oriented approaches. 
4.4.1 Past and current state analysis 
Prior work that delves into causation and contemporary dynamics provided a rich 
analysis of the current state of energy poverty in Nigeria. It found that the type of colonial 
governance, ethnic heterogeneity, and public service consumptionism are the primary factors 
that create the mental models that lead to weak governance both in energy, as well as other 
sectors in Nigeria (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(b)).  According to Chidebell-Emordi (2015(b)), 
colonies were expected to be self-sufficient and employed strategies to make resource 
extraction expedient: Africa was arbitrarily divided into nation-states, splitting indigenous 
nations between two, and sometimes three colonial entities; indirect rule was employed in 
non-settler colonies; and multiple tribal nation groups were coalesced into nation states 
lacking a unified national identity. These strategies created illegitimate leadership, mental 
models of elitism and complete dependence on the state for all public goods (Public service 
consumptionism), as well as models of resource extractive governance, leading to rent-
seeking and weak governance institutions. In the electricity sector, this weak institutional 
capacity is illustrated by the absence of quantifiable or progressive benchmarks in electricity 
production, transmission, and regulation in the country’s energy policy. It produces 
challenges in the form of compromised infrastructure, insufficient supply, and inadequate 
access to electricity. 
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4.4.1.1 The electricity sector 
Nigeria’s electricity sector contributes to only 4% of national GDP (Economist, 
2010). This is important considering that the cottage industry in Nigeria comprises 80% of 
all registered businesses (Ogechukwu, 2011), and 95% of wood fuel consumption in Nigeria 
is used for cooking and food processing (Oyedepo, 2012).  Studies in urban southwestern 
Nigeria show that only 3% of households have access to energy dense cooking fuels in the 
form of electricity and gas; in addition, households have an average of 8 hours of electricity 
supply per day (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(b)). 
In response to the rolling blackouts and brownouts, self-generation has turned out to 
be the dominant option in response to the massive system collapse of the electricity sector, 
equivalent to 20% of installed capacity (Foster and Steinbuks, 2009). Studies show that self-
generation with portable generators accounts for 72% of electricity supply for residents in 
urban southwestern Nigeria (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(a)). Other estimates have put private 
generation for the commercial sector at 90% ownership with trans-national corporations like 
Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble relying on self-generation for a 100% of their power 
supply (Connors, 2009). 
Self-generation is not a sustainable option for electricity supply: the cost of self-
generation is three times as high as the cost of grid electricity. It increases capital and 
operating costs, reduces competitiveness of local products, and hinders achieving economies 
of scale (Steinbuks & Foster, 2010). The insufficiency of the national electricity company to 
meet the electricity needs of an increasing population is apparent in widespread blackouts 
and inordinate electricity pricing. The latter created negative feedback loops that led to 
brownouts and load shedding over the past three decades (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015b).   
  128 
While literature holds that the energy poor spend a significant proportion of their 
income on energy (Buzar, 2007; Sovacool, 2012), electricity prices are subsidized in Nigeria, 
and consumers need pay only a portion of their bill to continue receiving service. However, 
households are billed a fixed amount every month, based on the classification of the building 
type, irrespective of how much electricity they consume (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(a)). Even 
as the Nigerian electricity sector is transitioning to a privatized system with metered 
consumption to increase transparency, there is resistance to this change with old actors 
within the new organizations. Some reports have the new power distribution companies 
sending out these “guesstimate” bills rather than reading the prepaid electricity meters, even 
when there have been blackouts for weeks (Fabowale, 2015). 
The impact of energy poverty is multidimensional: it impacts a household’s ability to 
earn an income, have assets, or savings so as to withstand economic and external shocks, 
affecting their financial capabilities; it limits access to adequate healthcare, education, 
nutrition, and other sanitation services, affecting human capabilities; low financial and 
human capital infer that energy-poor households are unable to participate as valued 
members of society, extending to their political capabilities which determines how much 
influence over, and participation in public policies that affect them. These dimensions of 
energy poverty are all interrelated and impact each other (See Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Coded themes of energy poverty 
Theme Sub-theme Representative Quotes 
Financial 
Capital 
Fewer income-
generating 
activities 
“I’m only in school because I cannot afford to run my 
business; the price of fuel (to run the generator) is too high.”  
- Male participant 
“I used to sell frozen chicken, frozen turkey, and those 
things, but the price of fuel is too high because there is no 
light. I was not making profit again so I closed shop.” – 
Female participant 
Low productivity “Because there is no light (electricity), we don’t make much 
profit, we spend too much on petrol.” – Female participant 
“ If there was light we can have bigger machines to grind 
stuff10; we can make more money that way.” – Female 
participant 
“Sometimes they will take light while I am barbing a 
customer’s hair, now I will have to turn on the generator, but 
I cannot charge the customer a different price because I have 
already started.” – Male participant 
Human 
Capital 
Education 
resources 
“If there is light, internet service will be more reliable.” – 
Male participant 
Safety “I will like to use electricity to cook instead of gas; it is safer 
for the little children.” – Female participant 
 
  
                                                 
10 Commercial mill used for grains, and vegetable purees.  
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4.4.1.2 The Vertically integrated System of Nigeria’s Electricity System 
Actors within the electricity socio-technical system are often broadly categorized into 
producers and suppliers (Parag & Janda, 2014). Post-independence up until 2002, the 
Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was the sole producer of electricity in charge of 
the generating plants, the transmission and distribution network as well as the setting of 
tariffs (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(b)). With the inability of NEPA to meet the needs of the 
growing population, in 2002 the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was created 
in preparation for the unbundling of the electricity sector. During this time the only actor at 
the different scales of the electricity sector was the state (Fig 4.3).  
 
In its current transitory state, Nigeria’s electricity sector is managed by public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) between the Ministry of Energy, through the Nigerian Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (NERC), and private companies (Fig 4.4). 
Figure 4.3 Pre-transition electricity system (1960-2014) 
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Tariff-setting was created by NERC via the Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) and 
will remain in place for the next fifteen years, or until such time as the electricity marketplace 
matures as evidenced by healthy competition (NERC, 2015). 
 
 
4.4.2 Sustainable Vision 
A sustainable vision for Nigeria ideally describes a future desirable state which entails 
a cohesive vision using multiple narratives provided by the stake holders. Visioning exercises 
were conducted to ground quantitative benchmarks in the realities of the stakeholders, 
subject to sustainability criteria. The results of visioning exercises are subsequently discussed.  
Figure 4.4 Transitory electricity system (2014 - ) 
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4.4.2.1 Visioning in the worst case scenario 
Visioning exercises in participatory research are used to elicit spontaneous feelings 
and concerns of relevant stakeholders based on their experiences, views, and concerns. 
Participants were asked to describe their vision of what constitutes an “ideal” and 
“expected” state of energy security with regards to electricity supply.  
At this juncture it is important to describe the impact of asking the open-ended 
question - what does an energy-secure Nigeria look like? How much electricity access would have an impact 
on your livelihood? This question was asked with the different stakeholder groups. For all 
groups: lay persons, undergraduate students, graduate students, and energy experts, the 
responses were the same.  
First, deafening silence for two to three minutes. The contrast of this reaction to the 
animated responses to the previous questions as to the impact of inadequate electricity 
supply on their livelihoods was palpable. Eventually, the responses came: some amount of 
electricity daily, with a general consensus of a minimum of eight hours daily. The consistent 
theme was that any scenario in which there was some electricity supply was preferred over 
the status quo. Some participants asked if it was possible to have uninterrupted power supply, 
and if there were parts of the world in which power was not rationed, even if only at night. 
While these responses indicate the understanding or expectations of gradual 
landscape change amongst the populace, they were not sufficient for determining the most 
sustainable vision. Due to the limitations of these visioning exercises, a composite analysis of 
literature on electricity consumption was used to determine context-specific quantitative 
short, medium, and long-term goals for electricity consumption. 
Quantitative benchmarks for energy poverty are typically computed for the lack of 
access based on physiological needs and purchasing power for a fixed amount of basic needs 
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in goods and services. Short term changes are defined as occurring within five years, medium 
term within 10-15 years, and long term within 15-25 years. 
For short term benchmarks, this paper uses the UNDP’s (2010) estimate of 100 kWh 
per person annually for lighting, health services, education, and communication devices, in 
addition to an average of 50 -1000 kgoe11 of modern fuels and technologies for cooking and 
heating. 
 
Medium-term benchmarks were based on the electricity consumption patterns of 
urban southwestern Nigeria at 1709.2 kWh/capita annually (Chidebell-Emordi, 2015(a)). 
This amount of electricity provides for added value to production in the cottage industry.  
                                                 
11 Kilogram of oil equivalent; 1 kgoe = 11.63 kWh 
Fig 4.5. Timeline for incremental access to energy services. Source: Author 
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Long-term benchmarks were based on direct and indirect energy consumption for a 
developing nation as proposed by Pachauri & Spreng (2004) at an annual consumption of 
2629.7 kWh/capita.  
These benchmarks are not meant to be prescriptive but rather suggestive of levels of 
electrification that are achievable while generation capacity is incrementally attained. 
4.4.3 The indicator-based transition management framework 
Drawing from previous work done by Sharma & Balachandra (2015), Shortall et al. 
(2015), and Vithayasrichareon (2012), a multi-level indicator-based framework is proposed to 
evaluate progress in the transition by specifying indicators in the social, economic, 
environmental, and institutional dimensions of the electricity system.  
The first step in creating the framework is to define short, medium, and long-term 
goals for electricity consumption per capita. Next, benchmarks for the multi-dimensional 
indicators within the electricity sector are defined. These benchmarks are threshold countries 
used as hypothetical frames of reference for best and worst performing. Prior work on 
electricity sustainability indicators used cross-country comparisons for ASEAN countries 
(Vithayasrichareon et al., 2012), normative sustainability goals as benchmarks (Schlor et al., 
2013), or algorithms for indicator aggregation (Martchamadol & Kumar, 2013). There is no 
standard baseline or benchmark for electricity sustainability indicators, as such, thresholds 
can be based on correlating set criteria such as development status, geographical area, or 
population to name a few.  
In addition, all indices are normalized using the equation: 
Normalized value =   Indicator value - Minimum threshold value  Eqn 1 
Maximum threshold value - Minumum threshold value 
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These indicators are used to create a composite index to evaluate the sustainability of 
the transition from an energy-poor economy to an energy secure one over the timeline 
specified. 
Social sustainability 
Social sustainability quantifies the extent to which electricity is accessible, affordable, 
equitable, and reliable for the average indigene. Research shows that within urban areas, 
households have physical connection to the grid; however the state of Nigeria’s transmission 
and distribution infrastructure creates low consumption levels, poor quality of electricity 
(brownouts12), increased household energy costs, and reduced productivity.  
                                                 
12 The Acceptability metric measures the percentage of time daily that the electricity was ±0.5% beyond the 
normal operating frequency and controls for brownouts. 
Table 4.1. Indicators for measuring social sustainability 
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Table 4.1 shows the indicators and the metric measured. The indicators address these 
issues and indicate if the electricity system is only meeting basic needs or if it adds value to 
production to improve livelihoods both at the household-level for cottage industry, or at the 
meso-level, adding to local/regional economic productivity.  
Environmental sustainability 
Nigeria is the third largest contributor to anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
from gas flaring, a direct result of its energy sector activities (Marland et al, 2005). These 
resource-extractive processes increase particulate matter in the air, create environmental 
degradation from ensuing acid rain, and undermine soil fertility. In addition, of its 21 major 
power plants in operation, only three produce electricity from renewable sources - 
hydroelectric power plants (Oyedepo et al., 2014).  
The composite indices of environmental sustainability assess the impact of the 
evolving electricity system on air, land, and water quality. These indicators track changes on 
the atmosphere in terms of air pollution, as well as water pollution and utilization; low 
carbon transition in terms of carbon intensity of the national electricity portfolio; and  
carbon intensity as a direct result of operations in the energy sector. 
i. Climate change: CO2 intensity of generated electricity [kg/kWh]; CO2 emissions per 
unit GDP [kg/ US$]; production of electricity from renewables (incl. hydro) [%]  
ii. Air /water quality: SOX [g/kWh]; NOX [g/kWh]; Particulates
13 (PM10, PM2.5 
exceedance) [µg/m3] 
                                                 
13 PM10 and PM2.5 exceedance refer to the size of particulate matter in the air. 
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iii. Low-carbon transition: % Coal-based generation in electricity portfolio; % natural 
gas-based generation in electricity portfolio; % growth of renewables capacity in past 
5 years. 
Economic sustainability 
The themes of economic sustainability are quantified in the resource stock, efficiency 
of generation, transmission, and distribution, and the costs of electricity generation in the 
form of tariffs and levelized costs from renewable technologies.  
Production indicators show trends of market demand and supply for fossil fuels 
which are exogenous variables that directly affect pricing of electricity, time to depletion of 
reserves, as well as generation capacity. This is particularly important in a decentralized and 
privatized system where a distributed system is assumed to make electricity supply and access 
more sustainable. 
Supply indicators are used to track efficiency losses in generation and distribution of 
electricity while end-use indices reveal changes in electricity consumption in both 
commercial and non-commercial sectors, an indicator of economic development 
(Goldemberg et al., 1985). Indicators in the security theme of economic sustainability track 
short-term and long-term reliability of fuel supply and fuel diversity which guard against 
price shocks in electricity pricing. 
i. Production: R/P14 for oil, coal, & gas [yrs]; production/consumption for oil, coal, & 
gas; % increase in generation capacity; renewables capacity/total capacity; % increase 
in renewables capacity 
                                                 
14 If the reserves for any fossil fuel are divided by the production rate at that point in time, the result is the 
length of time the reserves would last if production continued at that rate. 
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ii. Supply: % losses in transmission and distribution; average thermal efficiency of 
power plants 
iii. End use: % sectoral consumption for residential, agricultural, industry, and 
commercial and public services;  annual household consumption [kWh]; % change  
in annual household consumption 
iv. Security: % reserve margin15; fuel diversity for grid [Shannon-Wiener index16]. 
Institutional sustainability 
Electricity governance is the cohesive force behind the previously discussed 
sustainability themes. The themes of institutional sustainability pertain to governance, market 
dynamics, financing, and access to information.  
The governance indices track the existence of energy policy, its regulation and 
enforcement, level of energy planning, as well as transparency in energy governance 
institutions. This is important for nations that have modeled their governance institutions 
after the colonial legacy of the national government as a facilitator for resource extractive 
activities. In Nigeria, the governance institutions outside of oil and gas production and 
exportation are weak: the last national energy policy was drafted in 2003 with emphasis on 
energy production and resource exportation. Language on strategies for regulation, 
transparency, and enforcement in the energy sector were non-existent, making changes in 
the deeply ingrained energy governance institutions less likely. As such quantifiable 
benchmarks are crucial to change these institutions. 
                                                 
15 The reserve margin indicates the difference between the generating capacity of a power plant and 
anticipated peak loads. If the margin is too low, electricity costs are driven up when demand peaks; if it is 
too high, capital costs will be lost in power plants that sit idle for long periods of time. The reserve margin 
is determined by the climate and electricity consumption trends in the region. 
16 The Shannon-Wiener Index is a quantitative measure that computes the strength of diversity of fuel types 
(in this case). The higher the index, the wider the choice of electricity fuels, and the more buffered the 
electricity system would be to price shocks. 
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Market indicators track the business regulatory environment in relation to the ease of 
doing business and open access. Again, as the most ethnically heterogeneous country on the 
African continent with 250 distinct ethnic identities (Omotosho, 2014), Nigeria is naturally 
inclined to experience the network effect in which local and regional electricity 
administrators establish hereditary claims on administrative offices via patron-client linkages. 
This leads to a preference for transactions involving multiple intermediaries linked by a chain 
of personal acquaintances, in essence obfuscating transparency (Hamaguchi, 2012; 
Fafchamps, 2004). The governance indicators measure change in transparency, from the 
number of procedures to get an electricity connection, to translation of top-level decisions 
into practical actions. 
Indicators for finance and information access measure access to financing for energy 
projects as well as data coverage and release of energy statistics and planning documents. 
The scales indicate a range of values where higher numbers denote an ideal state. 
i. Energy sector governance: availability of national energy policy [Scale 1-3]; Extent of 
implementation of national energy policies [Scale 0-3]; quality of energy planning 
[Scale 0-3]; Transparency international corruption perception index [0-100]; Getting 
electricity index [1-189]17; 
ii. Competition and market: ease of doing business index [1-189]; status of open access 
[0-2]; business regulatory environment [0-6]. 
iii. Financial access: ease of access to financing for energy projects [1-189]. 
iv. Information access: periodic publications of official energy statistics, documents [1-
3]; data coverage [1-3]. 
                                                 
17 Measures the number of procedures, time (days), and cost (as % of income) required to get an electricity 
connection. 
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Energy systems are very much context-specific, varying between major economies, 
developing, and industrializing nations. As such a holistic approach to evaluating the 
problem, incorporating local perspectives and realities, within the overarching theme of 
sustainability, is important. In this study we propose an indicator-based transition 
management strategy encompassing the themes of environmental, social, financial, and 
institutional sustainability because addressing energy poverty in systems with complex 
governance institutions resistant to change needs benchmarks to ensure that progress, rather 
than being subject to the narratives, is measurable. 
Privatization of the electricity sector has the potential to decrease the size of the 
bureaucracy of energy governance and increase legitimacy of leadership since heterogeneity 
is decreased by decentralizing vertically integrated system of the electricity utility company.  
This infers that accountability might increase as the distance between the governors and the 
governed decreases. Thus these indicators can be used as sustainable goals in the transition 
management strategy.  
However, because the data required to populate the indicator tables is dynamic, 
reliability of in-country generated data is important for the transition to be truly sustainable 
and for the metrics-based system to be useful. This is a limiting factor due to the paucity of 
data especially within the themes of environmental and social sustainability: for instance data 
on carbon intensity of electricity generation depends on the reporting body and might vary 
widely between the Energy Information Administration, the United Nations Statistics 
Division, and Nigeria’s National Control Center, Osogbo. Some other data, such as “extent 
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of implementation of government policies” and “quality of energy planning” are subjective 
and as such care must therefore be taken to ensure integrity and consistency of all data. 
Finally, it is expected that the countries used as benchmarks for threshold values be 
at the same or greater level of development and that continuous analysis of the electricity 
system be conducted to ensure knowledge garnered from strategies, political and economic 
constraints, as well as conflicts, are incorporated into periodic transition assessment. 
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 CODING METHODOLOGY 
Data Analysis 
Using principles of grounded theory, the author and an academic colleague independently 
coded the data to identify recurrent themes, selecting participant comments that served as examples 
of each theme. Both researchers met to assess the concurrence of themes with supporting 
comments, new themes that might have arisen, and completeness of codes. Also, themes that did 
not have a frequency greater than two were discarded. Coding disparities were discussed until 
consensus was reached with documented transcripts checked to context and accuracy. 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
There were three groups of participants – lay persons that included petty traders, low-skilled 
laborers, as well as self-employed business men and women; graduate students; and faculty. 
Group 1: Lay persons 
There were 15 participants comprising 4 men and 11 women. The mean age was 43±3.8 years (range 
= 26 to 77 years).  
Group 2: Graduate students 
There were 15 participants comprising 9 men and 6 women. The mean age was 28.3±1 years (range 
= 21 to 36 years. 
Group 3: Faculty 
There were 15 participants, 3 females 12 males. Inquiring of age in this group was deemed to be 
improper.  
All were found to experience energy poverty in the form of challenges in terms of either financial or 
human capital.  
